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ABSTRACT
The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion is one of the most
important pieces of the International Court of Justice’s
jurisprudence. Delivered in 1996, only a few years after the end of the
Cold War, the world watched as the Court proclaimed that no body
of international law explicitly bans the use of nuclear weapons in
every scenario. This Note analyzes that ruling and its subsequent
interpretations and argues that it is short sighted. The Court believed
that use of all nuclear weapons may be illegal, but that the Court
lacked sufficient facts to determine whether that was true in every
scenario. The exemplary issue showcasing legality was self-defense.
This Note argues that the Court should have distinguished tactical
from strategic nuclear weapons and should have prohibited any use
of tactical nuclear weapons. As will be discussed, tactical nuclear
weapons are incapable of providing self-defense when the very
survival of the state is at risk, provide no greater military advantage
than conventional weapons, and cause indiscriminate effects in the
form of the uncontrollable spread of radiation. This Note, like the
Court in its opinion, does not comment on or argue about deterrence
as a matter of policy. Nor does this Note comment on the legality of
use of strategic nuclear weapons in self-defense. The scope of this
Note is limited to arguing that the Court should have held that
tactical nuclear weapons are different than strategic nuclear
weapons, and should have held that the use of tactical nuclear
weapons is, or would be, per se illegal.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity
because they are unimaginably destructive and can kill by
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tremendous blast, extreme heat, and indiscriminate radiation.1
One subset of “nuclear weapons” is tactical nuclear weapons,
which are defined as low-yield nuclear warheads intended for
battlefield and limited strikes.2 Battlefield and limited strikes are
exemplified by attacks on facilities in remote forests, deeply buried
facilities, and, the most classic example, a lone submarine in the
middle of an ocean.3 The explosive strength of nuclear weapons is
primarily measured in kilotons.4 Low-yield nuclear bombs
measure anywhere from less than one kiloton to about fifteen
kilotons.5 In contrast, some nuclear weapons can be more than

1. Catastrophic Harm, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
https://www.icanw.org/catastrophic_harm [https://perma.cc/UZ52-KBBN] (last visited
Dec. 6, 2020).
2. See Tactical Nuclear Weapons, BRITANNICA (last visited Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/technology/tactical-nuclear-weapon
[https://perma.cc/9Z8M-RETQ] (“small nuclear warheads and delivery systems intended
for use on the battlefield or for a limited strike”); see also North Atlantic Treaty
OF
NUCLEAR
FORCES
1-24-25
(2007),
Organization,
DEFINITIONS
https://www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng-nuclear/eng-app3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MC8-8B3Y] (explaining that Russia defines tactical nuclear weapons
as those with a depth of employment “up to 300 km” and the United States recognizes
tactical nuclear weapons as “nuclear forces designed for localized military missions”)
[hereinafter NATO Definitions]; Nikolai Sokov, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, NUCLEAR THREAT
INITIATIVE, (Apr. 30, 2002), https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/tactical-nuclearweapons/ [https://perma.cc/X4A5-MWYM]; see, e.g., The Davy Crockett, BROOKINGS (July
9,
2008),
https://web.archive.org/web/20080709011829/http://www.brookings.edu/projects/a
rchive/nucweapons/davyc.aspx [https://perma.cc/SP25-P95Q] (demonstrating how
tactical nuclear weapons operate by having limited ranges and limited yields). But see Hans
Kristensen & Matt Korda, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 2019, 75 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 252, 254 (2019) (“Unlike other types of nuclear weapons and associated
delivery systems, there is no universally-accepted definition for a ‘tactical,’ ‘nonstrategic,’
or ‘theater’ nuclear weapon. During the Cold War, such weapons were also referred to as
‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons.”).
3. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 381 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion] (J. Shahabudden,
dissenting) (recognizing battlefield strikes as those such as against “a lone nuclear
submarine at sea or against an isolated military target in the desert”).
4. See Thermonuclear Bomb, BRITANNICA, (last visited Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/technology/thermonuclear-bomb#ref258692
[https://perma.cc/NL73-ZRZQ].
5. Brian Alexander & Alistair Millar, Uncovered Nukes: An Introduction to Tactical
Nuclear Weapons, in TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS: EMERGENT THREATS IN AN EVOLVING
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, 3, 5 (Brian Alexander & Alistair Millar, eds., 2003); see also Ricky
Zipp, What Exactly Is A Low-Yield Nuclear Weapon?, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://dc.medill.northwestern.edu/blog/2018/02/09/exactly-low-yield-nuclearweapon/#sthash.PAfVMvMe.dpbs [https://perma.cc/7V2B-LWS7].
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1,000 kilotons.6 Conventional explosive weapons are generally
non-nuclear and have blast strengths which pale in comparison to
nuclear weapons.7 While they are technically “weaker,” the upper
echelon of conventional weapons rivals the practical effects of
tactical nuclear weapons.8 While states can use low-yield nuclear
weapons as strategic nuclear weapons, this discussion does not
consider strategic nuclear weapons of any yield.9 The term “tactical
nuclear weapon” as used here refers to a low-yield nuclear weapon
which is used for a battlefield or other limited strike.
Contemporary tactical nuclear weapons are considered lowyield while contemporary strategic nuclear weapons are
considered high yield.10 During World War II, the United States
dropped the low-yield nuclear weapon “Little Boy” on Hiroshima,
Japan.11 The power of the blast was likely between ten and fifteen
kilotons, though sources vary as to the exact tonnage of the
explosion.12 Little Boy was not a tactical weapon, however, because
6. See Caleb Larson, B83: The U.S. Military’s Most Dangerous Nuclear Weapon?,
NATIONAL INTEREST (Nov. 22, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/b83-usmilitarys-most-dangerous-nuclear-weapon-173089 [https://perma.cc/VN5R-YVUC].
7. See Yasmin Tayag, How Does the “Mother of All Bombs” Compare to a Nuclear
Bomb?, INVERSE (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.inverse.com/article/30306-moab-motherof-all-bombs-compare-nuclear-atomic-bomb-hiroshimanagasaki#:~:text=The%20MOAB%2C%20which%20contains%20over%208%2C000%2
0pounds%20of,an%20explosion%20equivalent%20to%2011%20tons%20of%20TNT
[https://perma.cc/VMB9-Y2SP]. The United States’ strongest conventional weapon
equates to eleven tons of TNT. Id.
8. See infra Section IV.B.
9. Strategic nuclear weapons are weapons that would not be used for battlefield
strikes, they are long-distance weapons that are typically stronger than tactical weapons.
See NATO Definitions, supra note 2 (stating that both the United States and Russia defined
strategic nuclear weapons as those “with ranges over 5500 kilometers”).
10. See id.; see also Jeff Schogol, Why There's No Such Thing as 'Tactical' Nuclear
Weapons, TASK & PURPOSE (Sept. 19, 2020) https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/notactical-nuclear-weapons/ [https://perma.cc/6MW9-WNSP] (discussing the nature of
why tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to nuclear escalation but uses the
terms low-yield and tactical nuclear weapon interchangeably).
11. Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, HISTORY.COM (last updated Apr. 26, 2021),
https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/bombing-of-hiroshima-andnagasaki#:~:text=Thick%20clouds%20over%20the%20primary%20target%2C%20the
%20city,and%20was%20built%20to%20produce%20a%2022-kiloton%20blast
[https://perma.cc/5U4Z-SPGF] (citing between twelve and fifteen kilotons).
12. Tyler Bamford, The Most Fearsome Sight: The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima, THE
NAT’L
WWII
MUSEUM:
NEW
ORLEANS
(Aug.
6,
2020),
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/atomic-bomb-hiroshima
[https://perma.cc/282Z-3H2W] (citing fifteen kilotons); but see Bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, supra note 11 (citing between twelve and fifteen kilotons).
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it did not operate as a limited strike against a military target.13
Rather, it was used and directed at a civilian population, though
some scholars disagree as to whether this was to end the war or to
intimidate the Soviet Union.14 Therefore, despite having a low
yield, Little Boy was not a tactical nuclear weapon; it was a lowyield strategic nuclear weapon. No country has used tactical
nuclear weapons, as defined here, in combat.15 This example shows
the nuance of yield and weapon use—strategic weapons can be
low-yield and tactical could be high-yield. Typically, however,
strategic are high-yield and tactical are low-yield. For the purpose
of this Note, a tactical nuclear weapon is only considered low-yield
and a strategic nuclear weapon is only considered high-yield.
This Note argues that there is no scenario in which the use of
a tactical nuclear weapon will comply with the principles of the
Law of Armed Conflict: discrimination, necessity, and
proportionality. The Law of Armed Conflict is analogous to
common law and relies on consulting multiple bodies of law to
ascertain the “rules” of war.16 Contemporary evidence reveals
13. See Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, Hiroshima Bomb: Japan Marks 75 Years Since
Nuclear Attack, BBC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia53660059 [https://perma.cc/6598-UCVN]; see also Gar Alperovitz, Did America Have to
Drop the Bomb? Not to End the War, But Truman Wanted to Intimidate Russia, WASHINGTON
Post
(Aug.
4,
1985),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1985/08/04/did-america-haveto-drop-the-bombnot-to-end-the-war-but-truman-wanted-to-intimidaterussia/46105dff-8594-4f6c-b6d7-ef1b6cb6530d/
[https://perma.cc/83GQ-F9DN]
(arguing that the United States used the atomic bomb in a geopolitical strategic way, not
as a battlefield weapon).
14. See Alperovitz, supra note 13; see also Ryan Browne & Scottie Andrew, Why the
US Dropped an Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, CNN (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/06/us/hiroshima-anniversary-explainertrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/9QX4-3AU2] (arguing that Truman used the bomb
because he was hard pressed to do so to end the war as quickly as possible); DEP’T OF STATE,
OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, Atomic Diplomacy (last visited Nov. 27, 2020)
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/atomic
[https://perma.cc/W6VE6UYP]. American policy and military advisers argued that the nuclear bomb “was a means
to a faster end to the Pacific conflict that would ensure fewer conventional war casualties.
They did, however, consider the role that the bomb’s impressive power could play in
postwar U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.” Id.
15. Tactical Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2.
LAW OF WAR MANUAL
7-12
(June
2015),
16. DEP’T. OF DEF.,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20
Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13172036-190 [https://perma.cc/QB5D-9VVV] (noting that this body of law relies on
customary international law and does not reside in a single treaty or other agreement, as
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some shortcomings of the International Court of Justice’s (“ICJ”)
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons (“ICJ Opinion”)17 as it relates to discussions of tactical
nuclear weapons.18 That opinion is arguably the most important
piece of nuclear weapons law19 but had a lackluster holding. The
Court held that nuclear weapons, if used, would probably break the
Law of Armed Conflict, but the Court could not definitively hold
that use always would be illegal.20 Therefore, the Court retained
the status quo.21 Research since the opinion22 supports other
dissenting opinions which largely agree that use of these tactical
nuclear weapons would be illegal.23 Therefore, the question of
it is a complex, living doctrine subject to change as the nature of warfare evolves)
[hereinafter "LAW OF WAR MANUAL"]; see also Jens Ohlin, The Common Law of War, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 493, 498 (2016) (discussing how the Law of Armed Conflict is not directly
the same as US common law, but derives historic underlying principles from Western
common law generally).
17. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 226.
18. Id. at 262, ¶ 94. The Court recognized “smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear
weapons,” which indicated that the Court was considering tactical and low-yield to be a
reference to the same type of nuclear weapon. Id. The Court used the terms tactical and
low-yield in only two other places. Id.
19. John Burroughs, Looking Back: The 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International
CONTROL
ASS’N
(July/Aug.
2016),
Court
of
Justice,
ARMS
https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_07/Features/Looking-Back-The-1996Advisory-Opinion-of-the-International-Court-of-Justice [https://perma.cc/W6WU-9QNZ]
(“The 1996 advisory opinion . . . was the culmination of a decades-long debate on the
legality of nuclear weapons. In recent years, it has shaped how international law is invoked
by the initiative focused on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons use and served
as a foundation for the nuclear disarmament cases brought by the Marshall Islands in the
court.”).
20. Id. (“The judges’ votes on the conclusion were evenly split, 7-7; it was considered
adopted due to the positive vote of Bedjaoui. Yet, the tie vote is misleading. In powerful
dissents, three of the seven judges who voted against the conclusion maintained that the
threat or use of nuclear weapons is unlawful in all circumstances.”).
21. See infra, discussion at Section IV.D.
22. See, e.g., Robert W. Nelson, Lowering the Threshold: Nuclear Bunker Busters and
Mininukes, in TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 22, at 68, 69; Kathryn Hansen, How
Would Nuclear War Affect the Climate?, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (Feb. 22, 2011),
https://climate.nasa.gov/news/483/how-would-nuclear-war-affect-theclimate/#:~:text=Instead%20of%20sulfate%20particles%2C%20like,in%20very%20dif
ferent%20climate%20impacts.&text=That’s%20because%20the%20particles%20differ,
prevent%20from%20reaching%20the%20ground [https://perma.cc/K3JN-FTWD].
23. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 381 (Shahabuddeen, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that no nuclear weapons are clean, and only clean nuclear
weapons could be legal outside of use for self-defense); id. at 549 (J. Weeramantry,
dissenting) (noting that the Court is incapable of delivering a broad ruling because there
are so many variations of nuclear weapons, but that tactical nuclear weapons as presented
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whether nuclear weapons could be legally used is answered here
only in relation to tactical nuclear weapons, which cannot be
legally used.24 This does not mean that the mere possession of
tactical nuclear weapons is illegal per se, but rather that their use
is.25
Part II is an overview of the guiding nuclear weapons law and
how international law has accepted the ICJ Opinion. Part III
analyzes the ICJ Opinion, notably the failure to address strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons as distinct entities, and other
arguments around use of tactical nuclear weapons. Part IV
presents research surrounding tactical nuclear weapons which
shows that these weapons cannot abide by the Principles of the
Law of Armed Conflict. Part IV further argues that tactical nuclear
weapons produce indiscriminate effects in the form of radiation,
are an unnecessary use of force that cause superfluous injury, and
are a disproportionate response in any scenario. Stated differently,
the tactical nuclear weapons of today could never be used on a
battlefield in accordance with the accepted Principles of the Law of
Armed Conflict, and any use of a tactical nuclear weapon would be
a breach of international law.
II. THE LAW OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Innovation in military technology since the Cold War has
made weapons more deadly, more reliable, and their use more
feasible.26 Disarmament—the process of disarming states of their
nuclear weapons—and nuclear weapon non-proliferation—the
were not lawful because if “nuclear weapons are generally illegal, there could not be an
exception for ‘small weapons’”); see generally id. at 556 (Koroma, J., dissenting) (explaining
that, in regard to low-yield rather than tactical weapons, the devastation in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was unfathomable and issues of radiation, including environmental degradation
and civilian death, persisted for long after the explosion).
24. Id. at 228, ¶ 1 (“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance
permitted under international law?”).
25. This is in line with what the court did in regards to deterrence. Id. at 254, ¶ 67
(“The Court does not intend to pronounce here upon the practice known as the ‘policy of
deterrence.’”); see also Per Se Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL (last visited Nov. 23,
2020), https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/per-se/ [https://perma.cc/V4S3-4XQL] (stating
that per se unlawful means unlawful in any circumstance).
26. See Brendan Thomas-Noone, Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Modern Nuclear
Era, LOWY INST. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/tacticalnuclear-weapons-modern-nuclear-era [https://perma.cc/BH8X-A9AB] (discussing how
tactical nuclear weapons today are “more precise and potentially more usable”).
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prevention of spreading nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states—
are persistent hopes amid the looming threat of nuclear
weapons.27 In 1996, the ICJ evaluated this threat of nuclear
destruction in its nuclear weapons advisory opinion (“ICJ
Opinion”).28 The ICJ is colloquially referred to as “the World’s
Court,” and its role is to settle disagreements between states.29 At
the request of states, the ICJ occasionally delivers advisory
opinions on disagreements pursuant to Article 96 of the United
Nations’ Charter.30 The ICJ Opinion has greatly impacted
international nuclear weapons litigants and advocates,31 and is
considered here as the premier document regarding legality of use
of nuclear weapons.
A.

Background Principles

The ICJ Opinion applied the Law of Armed Conflict to a
contemporary dilemma.32 The Law of Armed Conflict has a long
history, but today is largely codified customary law.33 Customary
law derives from generally accepted principals of legality and
binds all states to act in a certain way toward all states; this is
different than treaty law which binds signatories to act in a specific
way toward each other.34 The 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1954

27. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 75/83, U.N. Doc. A/75/PV.37 (Dec. 7, 2020).
28. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 227-28.
29. The Court, INT’L CT. OF JUST. (last visited Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.icjcij.org/en/court [https://perma.cc/64NW-FX3J].
30. What Is an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)? UNITED
NATIONS
(last
visited
Oct.
15,
2021),
https://ask.un.org/faq/208207
[https://perma.cc/W3XF-A577].
31. Pieter Bekker, Advisory Opinions of the World Court on the Legality of Nuclear
Weapons, 1 ASIL INSIGHTS (1996) (“[T]hese advisory opinions of the World Court are of
considerable significance to the development of the law of nuclear weapons and
international organizations . . . the legal reasoning leading to these conclusions reflects the
Court’s authoritative views on important issues of international law”); see also Burroughs,
supra note 19 (“[T]he advisory opinion remains an indispensable guide to the norms
compelling nonuse of nuclear weapons and their universal elimination.”).
32. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 226 (“law applicable in
armed conflict”).
33. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: BASIC KNOWLEDGE
8 (2002) [hereinafter ICRC BASIC KNOWLEDGE].
34. Customary International Humanitarian Law: Questions & Answers, INT’L COMM. OF
RED
CROSS
(Aug.
15,
2005),
THE
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/customary-law-q-and-a150805.htm [https://perma.cc/89EH-6A4Z].
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Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, and various other treaties, are written
documents spelling out what is legal and illegal during war.35
These treaties and other customary laws are the bedrock for
arguments both for and against the use of tactical nuclear weapons,
but today the ICJ Opinion is the foremost authority on the issue.36
The ICJ Opinion discussed both jus ad bellum, the law of
aggression and the creation of war, and jus in bello, the law of
regulating conduct during the course of warfighting.37 This
discussion of tactical nuclear weapons is squarely a jus in bello
principle because it considers tactical nuclear weapons used on the
battlefield as opponents wage war.38 This Note assesses the
principles of the Law of Armed Conflict in a state of war.39 Like
international law at large, the principles of discrimination,
necessity, and proportionality are influenced by treaty and
customary international law.40 Nevertheless, it is crucial to
35. See ICRC BASIC KNOWLEDGE, supra note 33; see also, 1954 Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. &
CULTURAL
ORG.
(last
visited
Mar.
13,
2021),
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/armed-conflict-andheritage/convention-and-protocols/1954-hague-convention/ [https://perma.cc/7RAD5MWP]; The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949additional-protocols [https://perma.cc/RC9R-Y4PU].
36. See Burroughs, supra note 19.
37. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: ANSWERS TO
YOUR QUESTIONS 21 (2015); see also Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at
259-61, ¶ 86-89.
38. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST & UNJUST WARS 21 (4th ed., 2006) (explaining jus in bello
is a term to describe the “observance or violation of the customary and positive rules of
engagement”); see also Matthew J. Aiesi & Amanda L. Minikus, The U.S. Should Communicate
in the Jus ad Bellum Lexicon to Strengthen Its Deterrence Posturing, LAWFARE (June 25,
2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-should-communicate-jus-ad-bellum-lexiconstrengthen-its-deterrence-posturing [https://perma.cc/E49J-6KAR] (noting that historic
use of deterrence has been undermined by United States’ failure to engage the lexicon of
jus ad bellum).
39. This Note does not make any claims to warfighting that amounts to an act of
aggression, which would constitute a jus ad bellum dilemma. Rather, this Note assesses
tactical nuclear weapons as removed from notions of aggression. It should be noted,
however, that escalation is not the same as aggression. Escalation is a product of war’s
conduct, while aggression is the triggering effect to begin a war. WALZER, supra note 38, at
21 (“[I]t is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to
be fought in strict accordance with the rules.”).
40. See CHARLES J. MOXLEY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST COLD
WAR WORLD, (Austin & Winfield eds., forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 45) (on file with
author).
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recognize that although the ICJ Opinion was non-binding, the Court
still had the legitimacy to discuss the legality of nuclear weapons,41
and that its discussion had a lasting impact.42
Breaking the Law of Armed Conflict would have a number of
consequences for states. On the one hand, they may open
themselves up to reprisals. Reprisals are illegal acts that are
permitted when done against a state to prevent it from continuing
to act in an illegal manner.43 For example, if the Soviet Union were
to illegally use a nuclear weapon on New York, the United States
would likely be justified in using a nuclear weapon on Moscow with
no legal consequence. States may also have to pay reparations for
breaking the Law of Armed Conflict.44
B.

The Calls for Control

At the request of some states that viewed the use or threat of
nuclear weapons as illegal, the ICJ agreed to deliver an advisory
opinion on the matter in 1996.45 The Court, however, held that it
did not have sufficient facts to conclude that use of nuclear
weapons would violate the Law of Armed Conflict in every
scenario.46 The holding did not distinguish tactical from strategic

41. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 235-36 (noting that it can
use article 65, paragraph 1 of the Statute that the United Nations, which created the ICJ, to
deliver advisory opinions when requested by member states).
42. See Burroughs, supra note 19.
43. See
Reprisal,
JRANK,
https://law.jrank.org/pages/9791/Reprisal.html#:~:text=In%20terms%20of%20INTER
NATIONAL%20LAW,intended%20to%20satisfy%20a%20claim
[https://perma.cc/B236-HGAT] (last visited Oct. 15, 2021) (“[T]here is a fine distinction
between a ‘lawful reprisal,’ and an act of revenge or retaliation, which are always illegal
under international law. Although reprisals are acts that normally would be considered
illegal, circumstances can boost them into the realm of the legitimate. To be considered
legitimate, reprisals must be taken in response to prior illegal attacks.”).
44. Frequently Asked Questions on the rules of war, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct.
19,
2016),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ihl-rules-of-war-FAQ-GenevaConventions#:~:text=What%20happens%20if%20you%20break,of%20IHL%20are%20
war%20crimes.&text=War%20crimes%20can%20be%20investigated,circumstances%2
C%20by%20an%20international%20court [https://perma.cc/93PY-WZ66].
45. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 226 (The Court granted
standing because the United Nations General Assembly requested it give an advisory
opinion).
46. Id. at 263, ¶ 95. The Court did not have enough facts “to enable it to conclude with
certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in” every scenario.
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nuclear weapons. Such a lack of distinction forms the basis of this
Note.47
Since delivered, the ICJ Opinion has not received much, if any,
affirmative praise.48 The ICJ Opinion favored the nuclear weapons
states, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Russia, over everyone else.49 Immediately after the Court delivered
its opinion, the nuclear weapons states neither boasted nor
celebrated, but rather noted that business would carry on as
usual.50 In contrast, non-nuclear states believed “the effects of
nuclear explosions are inherently uncontrollable and
indiscriminate and [sic.] the use of such weapons is therefore
unlawful in all circumstances.”51 In recent years, even some
nuclear states have called for disarmament, but none have done so,
and the ICJ has not held any nuclear state accountable for failing to
actually disarm.52
The current international law around tactical nuclear
weapons lawfully allows their use because the nuclear countries
do not consider their use per se illegal.53 However, this does not
47. The court used the terms low-yield and tactical nuclear weapons as
interchangeable, and used the terms to distinguish tactical from strategic weapons, but
then failed to deliver a rule reflecting this distinction. Id. at 262, ¶ 94 (“The Court would
observe that none of the States advocating the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under
certain circumstances, including the ‘clean’ use of smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear
weapons, has indicated what, supposing such limited use were feasible, would be the
precise circumstances justifying such use; nor whether such limited use would not tend to
escalate into the all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons. This being so, the Court does
not consider that it has a sufficient basis for a determination on the validity of this view.”).
48. See Burroughs, supra note 19.
49. See id. (finding even those non-nuclear states that were so culturally, politically,
and historically tied to nuclear states, such as Australia to the United Kingdom, vehemently
opposed use of nuclear weapons); see also Kelsey Davenport et al., Nuclear Weapons: Who
CONTROL
ASSOCIATION
(Oct.
2021)
Has
What
at
a
Glance,
ARMS
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat
[https://perma.cc/8YLV-GBLT] (discussing the amount of nuclear weapons known to be
owned by each nuclear state).
50. See Burroughs, supra note 19.
51. See id.
52. Philip Bump, Obama Calls for End to Nuclear Weapons, but U.S. Disarmament is
POST
(May
27,
2016),
Slowest
Since
1980,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com./news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/27/obama-calls-forend-to-nuclear-weapons-but-u-s-disarmament-is-slowest-since-1980/
[https://perma.cc/7792-BCAN].
53. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 266 (holding that use would
generally violate the Law of Armed Conflict, but deterrence and self-defense are legal state
policies and practices so the Court could not deliver a per se rule on legality of use); see
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preclude an interpretation that use is illegal. The Court also
emphasized that it would not hold that simply having, as opposed
to actually using, nuclear weapons was illegal because that is a
policy issue under deterrence and the ICJ would not comment on
that policy issue.54 The operative holding, however, was that
nuclear weapons cannot be per se illegal because self-defense may
merit a legal use even though other uses would “generally be
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict.”55 Strategists in charge of tactical nuclear weapons intend
for their use only in56 armed conflict,57 which makes the Court’s
failure to distinguish tactical from strategic nuclear weapons
problematic.
The Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict addressed here
are discrimination, necessity, and proportionality. Defining these
terms can be difficult as many publications and organizations have
different words or phrases that can alter the meaning of each
principle.58 Despite no clear definition for each principle, the ICJ
recognized that there is a common theme among the principles to
protect civilians subject to, but not party to, warfighting.59 It must
be noted that the sentiment of protecting civilians overrides any
contrary plain language used in defining such terms.

also INT’L AND OPERATIONAL L. DEP’T, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 138 (5th ed. 2015)
(noting that despite international agreements recognizing uncontainable weapons as
indiscriminate, the United States follows a more nuanced view of what it considers
weapons with effects that cannot be limited so as to “permit weapons such as cluster
munitions and nuclear arms”) [hereinafter “ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK”].
54. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 254, ¶ 67 (“[T]he Court does
not intend to pronounce here upon the practice known as the ‘policy of deterrence.’”).
55. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 257-65, ¶ 105.
56. This phrase of “in” is a bit peculiar but seems to mean “during,” which would
create a more fluid reading of the holding. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, surpa
note 3, at 266, ¶ 105.
57. See, e.g., Davenport et al., supra note 49 (explaining that these weapons are
designed in response to the growing power over conventional weapons, such as how
“Pakistan has lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use by developing tactical
nuclear weapons capabilities to counter perceived Indian conventional military threats”).
58. See ICRC BASIC KNOWLEDGE, supra note 33, at 12-13 (2002); see also Travis
Normand & Jessica Poarch, 4 Basic Principles, THE L. OF ARMED CONFLICT (last visited Mar.
12,
2021),
https://loacblog.com/loac-basics/4-basic-principles/
[https://perma.cc/7CYM-J8JD]; infra discussion Part IV.
59. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 257, ¶ 78.
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III. AN AMBIGUOUS HOLDING
Without stating the words “per se,” the ICJ eventually voted
and ruled that nuclear weapons are not illegal because states may
legally use them in self-defense. However, the Court held that their
use would otherwise generally violate the principles of the Law of
Armed Conflict.60 The Court left open whether a clean tactical
nuclear weapon could ever be created, and did not directly rule on
the per se legality of tactical nuclear weapons as distinct from
strategic nuclear weapons due to inconclusive facts.61 The issue
was whether a state could ever create and use a “clean” nuclear
weapon.62 The Court voted on seven issues but was divided over
the issue of legal threat or use of nuclear weapons.63 Three judges
dissented on the grounds that they believed all nuclear weapons
should be per se unlawful.64
A.

The ICJ Ruled on Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons Pari Passu
with Strategic Weapons

This Note addresses the fact that the ICJ did not rule on
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons as distinct entities.65 The
consideration of collateral effects and risk analysis are central to
60. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 266, ¶ 105 (“[T]he threat or
use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict . . . . However, in view of the current state of international law,
and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”).
61. Id. at 262 (arguing that the limitation of a “clean” tactical nuclear weapon was not
a real possibility at the time).
62. See infra Section III.B.
63. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 265-66. The Court took votes
on seven issues, four were unanimous, one vote was thirteen to one, another was eleven
to three, and the issue of legal threat or use was a seven to seven split with the President’s
vote counting as decisive to argue that use or threat of a nuclear weapon is not per se illegal.
Id.
64. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 381 (Shahabuddeen, J.,
dissenting); id. at 553-54 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); id. at 581 (Koroma, J., dissenting)
(“[T]hat in view of the established facts of the use of such weapons, it is inconceivable that
there is any circumstance in which their use would not violate the principles and rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict and, in particular, the principles and rules of
humanitarian law.”).
65. See id. at 546-50 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should
have distinguished more between tactical and strategic weapons because the Court heard
arguments that relied on this distinction).
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discussions around the use of a tactical nuclear weapon.66 Some
scholars have argued that the court’s language signals that there is
likely no scenario where use of a tactical nuclear weapon would be
legal,67 but this Note goes further to argue that contemporary
evidence suggests use of a tactical nuclear weapon is per se
illegal.68 The legal conclusions in the ICJ Opinion are explored
below in light of new facts discovered since the opinion was
rendered,69 such as facts discovered through more sophisticated
modeling of the effects of tactical nuclear weapons. Analyzing the
ICJ Opinion in light of these new facts is necessary given that it is
the leading legal document regarding use of nuclear weapons.70
B.

Scholars and Government Officials Recognize Tactical and
Strategic Nuclear Weapons as Distinct Entities

Technology has advanced at an exponential rate since the
Court rendered its opinion. The ICJ felt that the evidence presented
to the Court lacked necessary components and recognized that no
state had been able to develop a clean tactical nuclear weapon.71 A
clean nuclear weapon is one that does not produce radiation.72 The
66. See infra Part IV.
67. INT’L L. & POL’Y INST., NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW
7
(Oct.
2014),
https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docmanfiles/Nuclear%20Weapons%20Under%20International%20Law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8ZWW-7U45]; see also Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note
3, at 266, ¶ 105 (“[U]se of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law.”); see generally Nelson, supra note 22 (arguing not for per se illegality,
but producing evidence that supports the notion that use of a tactical nuclear weapon
would be illegal).
68. See Per Se Law and Legal Definition, supra note 25.
69. These new facts and the ICJ’s legal conclusions will be considered only for tactical
nuclear weapons. Any mention of strategic nuclear weapons is only for the sake of further
distinguishing or clarifying tactical nuclear weapons or the effects of their use.
70. See Burroughs, supra note 19.
71. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 262-63.
72. A clean tactical nuclear weapon is one in which the blast and heat are the only
effects, one where radiation is not disseminated or created in any way. See id. at 262; see
also William Burr, “Clean” Nukes and the Ecology of Nuclear War, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Aug.
30, 2017), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2017-08-30/cleannukes-ecology-nuclearwar#:~:text=%E2%80%9CClean%E2%80%9D%20weapons%20were%20designed%20
to%20ensure%20that%20most,%E2%80%9Csuperclean%E2%80%9D%20weapons%20were%20allfusion%20devices%20that%20proved%20elusive [https://perma.cc/42GT-RZMH].
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Court did not prescribe a per se rule in its opinion because it
believed a clean tactical nuclear weapon could exist in the future,
rendering tactical nuclear weapon usage more feasible.73 Since the
ruling, scholars continued to argue that clean nuclear weapons are
science fiction.74
Even before the ruling, the United States prohibited
development on a weapon below five kilotons so as to not blur the
line between nuclear and conventional weapons,75 which only
reinforced the notion that developing a clean tactical nuclear
weapon is impossible. Additionally, the Court noted that even if a
clean tactical nuclear weapon did exist, the Court could not
determine whether use of a tactical nuclear weapon would
immediately escalate conflict.76 Therefore, recognizing the unique
type of escalation from, and the inherent dirtiness77 of, tactical
nuclear weapons, military strategists have made it clear that
tactical nuclear weapons are distinct from strategic weapons.78
Had a clean tactical nuclear weapon existed, however, the Court
may have been able to assess it as more of a conventional weapon,
and the Court could still assess strategic nuclear weapons as they
relate to self-defense.79 As for what state entities have actually
created, tactical nuclear weapons are distinct from strategic

73. See MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript at 392-93). President Bedjaoui argued
that nuclear weapons are not at the point of being “clean weapons” and these “dirty nuclear
weapons” would be inherently indiscriminate, and, thus, illegal. So, the Court based its
reasoning of legality on the idea that there can be, in the future, a tactical nuclear weapon
that could possibly be a “clean nuclear weapons” and, therefore, the “dirty nuclear
weapons” of today that should be illegal are not. Id.
74. See generally Nelson, supra note 22; see also Burr, supra note 72.
75. See Nelson, supra note 22, at 69. This reinforces the idea that tactical and strategic
nuclear weapons are distinct because use of strategic nuclear weapons would never be on
par with conventional weapons, but tactical nuclear weapons are intended to be used like
conventional non-nuclear weapons. Id.
76. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 262, ¶ 94 (stating it lacked
“a sufficient basis for a determination on the validity” of escalation).
77. Nuclear weapons are referred to as “dirty” because of the spread and effects of
radiation. See Burr, supra note 72.
78. See AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32572, NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS 810 (2020) (describing the many methods of distinguishing tactical from strategic nuclear
weapons); see also infra Part IV (arguing that it is necessary to consider the possibility of
escalation and psychical occurrences, like radiation dispersion or blast effects, when using
a tactical nuclear weapon, but these considerations are different than strategic nuclear
weapons which are defense orientated).
79. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 266, ¶ 105.
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weapons because of factors such as explosive size, proposed use,
and delivery vehicles.80
Many scholars and politicians advocating for tactical nuclear
weapons do so for the sake of deterrence,81 which is an argument
outside the scope of this Note. One argument for use of a tactical
nuclear weapon is in response to another’s use of a tactical nuclear
weapon.82 This argument does not make responsive use “legal”
insofar as it is a “reprisal,”83 especially when considering that these
wrongs could lead to the death of hundreds of millions of people.84
Reprisals are, essentially, illegal acts that are undertaken in
response to a previously committed illegal act and are, therefore,
excused and not treated as “illegal.”85

80. See WOOLF, supra note 78; see also Vipin Narang, The Discrimination Problem: Why
Putting Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons on Submarines is so Dangerous, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Feb.
8, 2018), https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/discrimination-problem-putting-lowyield-nuclear-weapons-submarines-dangerous/ [https://perma.cc/2VRM-AK4K] (stating
the Trump administration advocated putting tactical warheads on one delivery system
which blurred the line between tactical, low-yield and strategic, high-yield nuclear
weapons).
81. See generally WOOLF, supra note 78.
82. Daniel Cebul, Nonstrategic Nukes: What Are They Good For?, DEFENSENEWS (Feb.
26, 2018) https://www.defensenews.com/space/2018/02/26/nonstrategic-nukeswhat-are-they-good-for/ [https://perma.cc/VK74-ECXM].
83. Reprisals, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (last visited Mar. 13, 2021),
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/reprisals#:~:text=Reprisals%20are%20only%20allo
wed%20under,reprisals%20in%20international%20humanitarian%20law
[https://perma.cc/GAQ4-VM9L] (“A ‘reprisal’ is a breach of international humanitarian
law, which would otherwise be unlawful but in exceptional cases is considered lawful as
an enforcement measure in response to a previous breach of international humanitarian
law by the enemy, with the purpose of terminating the enemy’s violation. Thus, reprisals
are intended to put pressure on the enemy in order to obtain the enemy’s compliance with
international humanitarian law. Reprisals are only allowed under very strict conditions
and there is a trend towards outlawing reprisals in international humanitarian law.”)
[hereinafter “Reprisals”].
84. See Ellen Ioanes & Dave Mosher, A Terrifying New Animation Shows How 1
‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapon Could Trigger a US-Russia War that Kills 34 Million People in 5
Hours, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/tactical-nuclearweapons-escalation-us-russia-war-animated-strike-map-2019-9
[https://perma.cc/KJ89-MLKS] (noting that one reading of a tactical nuclear weapon
launch, even if incorrect, could lead to retaliatory strikes resulting in massive worldwide
death tolls).
85. See Reprisals, supra note 83.
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Interpretations of the Opinion

Scholars have taken a number of approaches to interpret the
Opinion’s rather ambiguous holding.86 The Court ruled by a no
majority 7-7 vote, the decision that use of nuclear weapons is not
always illegal was a tie.87 The tie was only broken in favor of the
judges on the "legal" side because, in the event of a tie, the
President of the ICJ's vote was the tie breaker.88 Some scholars,
especially disarmament advocates, relied on the Court’s ruling to
advocate for greater adherence to good faith negotiations for
disarmament.89 Other scholars ignored the plain language of the
Opinion and looked at the subtext—notably, that this was an
attempt to limit the nuclear countries’ right to bear arms.90 Others
argued that the Court may not have even had the authority to
answer the question, further supporting the idea that nuclear
weapons are political in nature.91 Regardless of whether scholars
86. There were several ambiguous discussions in the opinion, such as “use of nuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict . . . [h]owever . . . the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use
of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of selfdefence.” Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 266, ¶105; see, e.g., Robert
Turner, Nuclear Weapons and the World Court: The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and Its
Significance for U.S. Strategic Doctrine, 72 INT. L. STUDS. 309, 320-22 (arguing that the
court’s language of self-defense is ambiguous because it blurs the world’s nations’ right to
collective self-defense).
87. See Bekker, supra note 31 (recognizing that when a ruling is a tied vote, as
occurred in the Opinion, the President’s vote is determinative for which side wins). In the
nuclear weapons advisory opinion, seven judges felt that all nuclear weapons were per se
illegal, and seven felt that the opposite was true; the President’s vote, that the opposite
was true, thus ruled the day. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Burroughs, supra note 19 (noting that “[a]ll judges voted for the resulting
formal conclusion: ‘There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control’”).
90. Turner, supra note 86, at 313 (“T]hus, the only real question to be addressed was
not whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was ever lawful, but whether
international law prohibited a State in possession of nuclear weapons from using them, or
threatening to use them, under any conceivable circumstances in a defensive response to
armed international aggression.”)
91. See Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, The Advisory Opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 27 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 345, 350-51 (1999)
(recognizing that many scholars who opposed the opinion believed that this was not a legal
question ripe for the Court to answer). United Nations’ Charter Article 96 requires that a
question for the Court be legal and not political, and many adversaries saw the question of
use as inherently political, but Smis and Van der Borght do not necessarily take that
position themselves. Id. at 351.
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supported the ICJ Opinion, opposed the opinion, or were
uncomfortable with the amount of “grey area,” most recognized
that it was an exceptionally rare and important ruling.92 Nuclear
weapons policymakers and litigators have used the ruling to
advocate both for and against the use of nuclear weapons.93
IV. ANALYSIS OF USE AS IT WOULD RELATE TO THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT
This Part will explore three principles of the Law of Armed
Conflict: discrimination, necessity, and proportionality, insofar as
they relate to the use of a tactical nuclear weapon.94 Illegal use of
any weapon constitutes a breach of any of these principles.95 The
ICJ's recognition that use of a nuclear weapon would generally
constitute an illegal act was an astute and correct application of the
facts of nuclear weapons to the legal principles.96 Based on
research and developments following the opinion, if the ICJ
revisited the question of legal use of nuclear weapons, it should
rule that tactical nuclear weapons are per se illegal because there
92. See Liz Heffernan, The Nuclear Weapons Opinions: Reflections on the Advisory
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 28 STETSON L. REV. 133, 134 (“[T]his was the
first occasion on which the ICJ directly addressed the fundamental issue of the status of
nuclear weapons under international law.”).
93. See Burroughs, supra note 19 (discussing how countries litigate nuclear weapons
controls).
94. There are many principles of the Law of Armed Conflict, but these three are the
most commonly recognized as the major principles. See MOXLEY, supra note 40, at 24; see
also Brian L. Bengs, Legal Constraints Upon the Use of a Tactical Nuclear Weapon Against
the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Iran, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 323 (2008).
95. See Joanne Lu, The ‘Rules of War’ are Being Broken. What Exactly are They?, NPR
(June
28,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/28/621112394/the-rules-ofwar-are-being-broken-what-exactly-are-they
[https://perma.cc/WAG3-EY2A]
(discussing what it looks like when countries act illegally during the course of war, such as
noting that “[i]f the expected ‘incidental civilian damage’ of an attack is ‘excessive’ and
‘disproportionate’ to the anticipated military gain, then the attack legally cannot be carried
out”).
96. The Court did not prescribe illegal per se because use in self-defense in which the
very survival of the state is at stake would not be subject to the principles of the Law of
Armed Conflict. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 262-63, ¶ 95 (“[T]he
use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for such
requirements. Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have sufficient elements
to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily
be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any
circumstance.”).
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is no factual scenario in which they conform to the principles of the
Law of Armed Conflict, particularly in light of the unavoidable risks
associated with radiation.97
A.

Discrimination

The United States believes the principle of discrimination
relies on the notion that civilians and their property cannot be
targeted as military objectives.98 Every branch of the US military
follows this seemingly objective standard,99 but it poses a variety
of subjective questions.100 The statement merely protects citizens
from being directly targeted but permits collateral damage against
non-targeted civilians.101 The collateral damage must not be
“foreseeably excessive in light of the anticipated military
advantage to be gained.”102 Thus, the seemingly objective principle
is actually subjective in practice and relies on a variety of tests and
risk analyses to determine whether a strike can properly
discriminate.103 Under this subjective standard, tactical nuclear

97. See ALEXANDER & MILLAR, supra note 5; see also MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript
at 250-51) (“McNeill’s language–’precisely engaging discrete military objectives’–seems to
suggest that the United States can control the radioactive fallout from ‘modern delivery
systems’ or that such effects, in the United States’ view, are not relevant to the analysis.”)
(citing US DEP’T OF STATE, WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA at 23 (June 20, 1995)).
98. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS § 9.1.2 (2017) (setting out law applicable to the navy, marines, and the coast
guard) [hereinafter NAVAL HANDBOOK]; but see Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra
note 3, at 257 (“[On the] distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must
never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that
are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.”).
99. See CURTIS E. LEMAY CTR. FOR DOCTRINE DEV. & EDUC., BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF WAR AND THEIR TARGETING IMPLICATIONS 90 (Mar. 15, 2019); US DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ADP
3-0 OPERATIONS 3-56 (July 31, 2019) [hereinafter US OPERATIONS]; NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra
note 98, at § 9.1.2; US DEP’T OF THE ARMY SPACE FORCE, FM 3-14 ARMY SPACE OPERATIONS, 118 (Oct. 2019).
100. The claim is to protect civilians and defeat combatants, but it is much more
complicated when considering the idea that some civilians can be targeted if they are
sufficiently a part of the war-fighting process, such as factory workers.
101. See NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 98, at § 9.1.2.
102. Id. This rule is similar to that of proportionality but is different because
discrimination is based on anticipating, or failing to anticipate, civilian casualty, whereas
proportionality knows civilian casualty will occur but questions whether than casualty is
justified by the military advantage gained. Id.; infra Section IV.B.
103. See ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK, supra note 53, at 142-47 (discussing how the
United States engages a case-by-case analysis for whether a strike is proportional); see also
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weapons cannot discriminate due to their unique effects of
radiation.
1. The Discrimination Standards
The ICJ Opinion on legality of use was a split decision.
President Bedjaoui, President of the ICJ when it rendered the
opinion, was the decisive vote against per se illegality, but even he
had serious reservations about legality.104 He recognized both that
nuclear weapons have lasting negative effects on the environment
and the right to life, and that no dirty nuclear weapon would ever
be able to discriminate between combatants and civilians.105
Tactical nuclear weapons' dirtiness makes their effects
uncontrollable and their use illegal, while clean nuclear weapons
remain a fantasy.106
The United States’ conception of discrimination argued before
the Court was too bound to the technological inferiorities of the
past.107 Some branches of the military still follow that antiquated
definition108 which was based on weapons of possibility,
exemplified by Japanese balloons loaded with bombs sent adrift
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 16, at 61, ¶ 2.4.1.2 (“[U]nder the law of war, judgments of
proportionality often involve difficult and subjective comparisons.”).
104. See SHANE DARCY, JUDGES, LAW AND WAR: THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 195 (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2014).
105. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 272, ¶ 20.
106. See James L. Denton, The Third Nuclear Age: How I Learned to Start Worrying
About the Clean Bomb (Feb. 13, 2013) (Research Report Submitted to the Faculty, Air
University) (on file with United States Defense Technical Information Center) (“This paper
does not answer whether the fusion technology is possible and assumes it as an inevitable
technological advancement. Instead, this study predicts a world in which low yield, clean
fusion weapons exist and considers their implications.”); see also Neutron Bomb,
(last
visited
Mar.
20,
2021),
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/technology/neutron-bomb
[https://perma.cc/6X457QWH] (discussing a “clean” nuclear bomb that failed to garner mass production but was
proposed to use highly concentrated radiation to kill humans without damaging property).
107. See Letter of the United States at 23, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 (the United States
in its letter for the court argued that “since nuclear weapons can be directed at a military
objective, they can be used in a discriminate manner and are not inherently
indiscriminate”).
108. US OPERATIONS, supra note 99, at 3-56 (focusing on targeting by requiring that
armed forces must distinguish between armed forces and civilian populations but makes
no mention of limiting effects); but see NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 98, at § 5.3.4 (some
weapons are illegally indiscriminate if “the effects of which cannot be limited as required
by the Law of Armed Conflict”).
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into wind currents blowing toward the United States’ west coast
during World War II.109 The core of the rule of discrimination,
however, rests on the idea that civilians will have a general
protection against the direct effects of hostilities.110
The civilian and military technology of today is immediate and
extremely precise.111 Missiles can hit exact targets in a matter of
minutes.112 Hence, the question that Judge Higgins, who dissented
in the opinion, wrestled with—whether the determinate factor for
a discrimination analysis is missile capabilities or missile
effects113—seems resolved by contemporary technological
innovation. Missile targeting is more reliable now, so there must
be greater credence for the effects of tactical nuclear strikes, such
as the uncontrollable spread of radiation, which cannot be targeted
toward anyone.114 The uncertainty of radiation dispersion is
greater than the uncertainty of a missile missing its target.
Humanity and the protection of life demand that effects, not
targeting, should be the major factor for considering
discrimination of tactical nuclear weapons.
2.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Cannot Discriminate

Radiation dispersion is integral to arguing that tactical
nuclear weapons are per se illegal on the grounds that they are
109. See NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 98, at § 9.1.2 (“[W]eapons that are incapable of
being directed at a military objective are forbidden as being indiscriminate in their effect.
Drifting armed contact mines and long-range unguided missiles (such as the German V-1
and V-2 rockets of World War II) fall into this category.”).
110. Direct effects in this context means things like collateral damage and other
proximate causes, but should exclude things like mass famine. See Jean-François
Quéguiner, The Principle of Distinction: Beyond an Obligation of Customary International
Humanitarian Law, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 161, 161 (Hensel ed., 2008);
see also Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 262, ¶ 95 (discussing the
discrimination and agreed with states advocating illegality on the grounds that the unique
characteristics of nuclear weapons, notably radiation, show that “the use of such weapons
in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for” discrimination).
111. See, e.g., Iran’s attack on Iraq shows how precise missiles have become, ECONOMIST
(Jan.
18,
2020),
https://www.economist.com/science-andtechnology/2020/01/16/irans-attack-on-iraq-shows-how-precise-missiles-havebecome [https://perma.cc/UR7T-TUF6].
112. Id.
113. MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript at 392-96).
114. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 366-67, ¶ 24 (Higgins,
J., dissenting) ("[I]t may be concluded that a weapon will be unlawful per se if it is incapable
of being targeted at a military objective only, even if collateral harm occurs.").
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indiscriminate.115 The ICJ did not directly address the issue of
weather, such as wind and oceanic storms, but did note the
importance of environmental protection.116 This may be
attributable to the fact that the models studying the environmental
effects of nuclear war available to the parties in the ICJ Opinion
were limited.117 The technology and modules studying the effects
of nuclear weapons today are much more sophisticated than those
with which the ICJ worked. The National Research Council's
(“NRC”) comprehensive review of the effects of low-yield earthpenetrating nuclear weapons, which are designed to contain
radiation underground, forms the basis of this assessment of
discrimination.118 The bulk of this analysis recognizes radiation
dispersion as inherently indiscriminate and also notes the unique
effect of extreme shock waves that disseminate from a tactical
nuclear blast which can rupture the eardrums and lungs of civilians
in surrounding areas.119
Consider a target thirteen kilometers from the nearest town
and sixty kilometers from the nearest city. The NRC believes that a
ten kiloton bomb, targeted at an underground chemical warfare
facility, penetrating three meters of earth would kill roughly one
thousand people on average.120 This figure, however, is not
indicative of the total range of possible casualties121 because earthpenetrating weapons with explosive strength lower than three
hundred kilotons kill more people, notably civilians, by fallout than
by initial blast.122 So, any tactical nuclear weapon used as an earth
penetrating weapon will be deadly to civilians, not merely because
of the blast, but due to both fallout damage and radiation as well.
115. See id. (recognizing a significant overlap with other principles, Judge Higgins
determined that proportionality largely relied on targeting without regard to collateral
damages to non-targeted people and places, but “[t]o the extent that a specific nuclear
weapon would be incapable of this distinction, its use would be unlawful”).
116. Id. at 241, ¶ 27.
117. Hansen, supra note 22. There is a noticeable lack of discussion in the ICJ Opinion
of the weather, even though US arguments recognized it as a factor. See MOXLEY, supra note
40 (manuscript at 251-52) (noting that the United States argued at hearings that it would
consider the weather as a factor in military planning).
118. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR EARTH-PENETRATOR AND
OTHER WEAPONS (National Academies Press 2005) [hereinafter NRC].
119. See id. at 73.
120. See id. at 80-81.
121. See id. at 80-92.
122. See id. at 82.
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki do not provide reliable historical
evidence of radiation effects because those bombs fell from a very
high altitude creating a fallout-free zone.123 War strategists believe
tactical nuclear weapons have a unique use as earth penetrating
missions.124 The distinction between using a tactical nuclear
weapon in a fallout-free zone and as an earth-penetrating weapon
is extreme. Unanticipated winds for an earth-penetrating tactical
nuclear strike at the target mentioned above, by a ten-kiloton
bomb, could kill anywhere from three thousand to one million
people.125 Beyond this specific target example, the NRC recognized
two other targets, and the results were the same: incorrect
assessments of wind patterns or any other meteorological or
geological considerations could lead to an exponential increase in
civilian deaths because of indiscriminate radiation.126
NRC research shows that environmental analysis of a tactical
nuclear strike would have to be flawless.127 Nuclear states are
apprehensive of passing the nuclear threshold, and, therefore,
reserve the use of tactical nuclear weapons for extreme scenarios.
States only consider tactical nuclear weapons in severe situations
that require them to make decisions within a moment’s notice.
Military officials therefore cannot accurately plan for or analyze
the spread of radiation, which would spread indiscriminately.128
Despite technological advancements of missile targeting, the
failure to contain or eliminate the spread of radiation from use of a
123. Basic Effects of Nuclear Weapons, ATOMICARCHIVE.COM (last visited Nov. 6, 2021),
https://www.atomicarchive.com/science/effects/basic-effects.html
[https://perma.cc/8CBH-RKY3] (recognizing that as altitude increases, fallout decreases).
124. See NRC, supra note 118, at 82 (a fallout free zone is the height at which a nuclear
weapon can explode in the air without sending radioactive earth into the air which
eventually would lead to it coming back down in the form of radioactive fallout).
125. This number range is considering only wind, but NRC argues that precipitation
could actually drastically increase the casualty range, and others have noted that nuclear
explosions increase precipitation. See id. at 83; see also Sid Perkins, Can Nuclear Fallout
MAGAZINE
(May
13,
2020),
Make
It
Rain?,
SCIENCE
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/05/can-nuclear-fallout-make-itrain#:~:text=Radioactive%20fallout%20is%20rarely%20a,caused%20water%20drople
ts%20to%20coalesce [https://perma.cc/XQ86-RWYR].
126. NRC, supra note 118, at 80-87.
127. This is an assessment of the research compiled by NRC, that work does not make
this claim. But see id. at 86 (noting that even though NRC researched a plethora of variables,
there were many more that they did not consider, such as cloud passing and formations
and how those clouds would carry radiation, that would only increase the total casualties).
128. See NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 98, at § 9.1.2.
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tactical nuclear weapon would be a breach of discrimination. The
ICJ Opinion recognized that even though civilians may not be
targets, the unique and extreme effects of nuclear weapons pose
such an existential threat that the rule of discrimination recognizes
the greater risk associated with nuclear weapons than
conventional ones.129
B.

Necessity

The United States recognizes that necessity is a rule of scope
to prevent unnecessary measures; if something is not necessary to
accomplish a military purpose, it violates necessity.130 For
example, regardless of the type of weapon, the use of a 500-ton
bomb to destroy a target that a five-ton bomb could destroy would
breach necessity. Some scholars argue necessity is not a weaponspecific test but rather an analysis of a variety of considerations
about military objectives.131 Some branches of the United States’
military argue that so long as a weapon is not designed to create
superfluous human injury, it is not “unnecessary force.”132
However, other branches argue that force in excess of what is
required to complete a mission is unlawful.133 Combining these
two definitions acknowledges that unnecessary or excessive
destruction of civilian life or property is unlawful.134 For that
reason, complying with the rule of necessity relies on two things:
that a weapon does not create superfluous injury and that it does
not destroy to a degree more than necessary for military
success.135
129. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 262, ¶ 92.
130. See Military Necessity, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (last visited Nov. 28, 2020),
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/militarynecessity#:~:text=The%20principle%20of%20military%20necessity%20is%2C%20like
%20the,are%20not%20otherwise%20prohibited%20by%20international%20humanita
rian%20law [https://perma.cc/SR2N-FN5W]; see also DARCY, supra note 104, at 150
(noting that some ICJ judges recognized necessity as a principle which serves to preserve
basic humanity considerations).
131. See generally WALZER, supra note 38, at 138-59.
132. See NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 98, at § 9.1.1.
133. See TONYA HAGMAIER ET AL., AIR FORCE OPERATIONS AND THE LAW 14 (2d ed. 2009).
134. See NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 98, at § 9.1.1; see also HAGMAIER ET AL., supra
note 133, at 14.
135. Superfluous injury is more readily attributed to protecting soldiers, but it also
applies to civilians, and necessary destruction is more readily attributed to civilians.
Because the purpose of the Law of Armed Conflict is to protect civilians, both are necessary
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1. Superfluous Injury and Death by Radiation
Hollow tip bullets, poison bullets, and glass bombs are three
paradigmatic examples of an unnecessary weapon.136 Hollow tips
are also known as “exploding” bullets because their weak casing
causes them to shatter upon impact.137 Poison bullets are exactly
as the name suggests; bullets imbued with poison to make any hit
fatal.138 Glass bombs are designed to explode and send untraceable
shards of glass into combatants, leaving them inoperably
injured.139 All of these weapons are considered “small arms”140 and
do not pose any threat to property like nuclear weapons would.
Like nuclear weapons, however, these illegal weapons ensure the
unnecessary death of an enemy who may otherwise survive while
still being sufficiently removed from combat, such as by significant,
nonlethal injury.141
Tactical nuclear weapons offer the same type of superfluous
injury as the aforementioned illegal weapons by radiation spread.
for a definition because both apply to civilians. See US AIR FORCE, ANNEX 3-60 BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF WAR AND THEIR TARGETING IMPLICATIONS, 89-90 (Mar. 15, 2019)
(noting that the principle of unnecessary, also known as superfluous, suffering is
sometimes recognized as a principle by itself or under the umbrella of necessity); see, e.g.,
Practice Relating to Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or
Unnecessary Suffering, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, (last visited Nov. 6, 2021), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule70
[https://perma.cc/KV5F2DCT] ("[R]elated to the principle of military necessity, and implicitly contained within it,
is the principle of unnecessary suffering.") [hereinafter "IRCR Superfluous Injury"].
136. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE: FIELD MANUAL NO. FM 27–10
(with change 1976) [hereinafter Law of Land Warfare]; see also IRCR Superfluous Injury,
supra note 135, at XI ("[S]pecific applications of the prohibition formulated in … the Hague
Regulations [are] … explosive bullets and projectiles filled with glass[,] … bullets of
irregular shape or with a hollowed out nose[,] … [and] poison and poisoned weapons.").
137. See Ammunition Illegal and Controversial Ammunition, LAWS.COM (Dec. 22,
2019),
https://gun.laws.com/ammunition/ammunition-illegal-and-controversialammunition#:~:text=Military%20use%20of%20the%20hollow%20tips%20is%20prohi
bited,fatal%20than%20bullets%20that%20pierce%20through%20a%20target
[https://perma.cc/TJ7P-U3KA].
138. See KIM COLEMAN, A HISTORY OF CHEMICAL WARFARE 7 (2005).
139. See MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript at 114-15).
140. See Small Arms and Light Weapons, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (last visited Nov. 11,
2020),
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/small-arms.htm
[https://perma.cc/R67L-VMGE].
141. These deaths are considered “unnecessary” because combatants would lose
their warfighting capabilities after being removed from the battlefield due to a substantial
injury from either a bullet ripping through them or from the shockwaves of a bomb. The
true goal of warfighting tactics is not to kill, but, rather, to prevent the enemy from
continuing to fight whether by death or disability. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 143-44.
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Nuclear weapons are designed to eliminate the physical trace of
everything in the targeted zone by an extreme blast which releases
heat at the same temperature as the center of the sun.142 A tactical
nuclear strike would annihilate the target, vaporize any organic
matter close enough to the blast, and almost certainly reduce
structures to rubble.143 Evidence from the Hiroshima bombing, a
low-yield strategic nuclear weapon,144 shows that standing
building frames were an anomaly and the only remnants of human
bodies within the blast radius were the “shadows” burned into the
pavement by blasts of extreme heat.145
Those that do survive are by no means safe.146 The bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki resulted in increased leukemia cases in
both adults and children in the fallout zone for nearly a decade
after the explosion.147 The NRC research above further supports
that both soldiers and civilians could be subject to excessive
142. See How Do Nuclear Weapons Work?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (July 12,
2018),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/how-nuclear-weapons-work
[https://perma.cc/72GB-52F3] (stating the heat from a nuclear blast reaches several tens
of millions of degrees within a fraction of a second).
143. See Basic Effects of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 123 ("Most damage comes from
the explosive blast. The shock wave of air radiates outward, producing sudden changes in
air pressure that can crush objects, and high winds that can knock objects down. In general,
large buildings are destroyed by the change in air pressure, while people and objects such
as trees and utility poles are destroyed by the wind."); see also Thermal Radiation,
(last
visited
Nov.
6,
2021),
ATOMICARCHIVE.ORG
https://www.atomicarchive.com/science/effects/thermal-radiation.html
[https://perma.cc/4N8S-ERKD] ("Temperatures of a nuclear explosion reach those in the
interior of the sun, about 100,000,000° Celsius, and produce a brilliant fireball.").
144. Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, supra note 11 (Little Boy was the bomb
dropped on Hiroshima, and it was between twelve and fifteen kilotons); see also ALEXANDER
& MILLER, supra note 5, at 5.
145. Lottie Tiplady-Bishop, Hell on Earth, SUN (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/12321021/harrowing-images-reveal-devastationhiroshima-nagaski/ [https://perma.cc/6NZ3-5TRC]; see also Katie Serena, The Eerie
Shadows Of Hiroshima That Were Burned Into The Ground By The Atomic Bomb,
ALLTHATSINTERESTING.COM (July 31, 2020), https://allthatsinteresting.com/hiroshimashadows [https://perma.cc/C3JQ-K4U2]; Nick Kirkpatrick, 69 Years After Hiroshima, a
(Aug.
6,
2014),
Look
at
the
Dome
that
Survived,
WASH. POST
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/06/69-yearsafter-hiroshima-a-look-at-the-dome-that-survived/ [https://perma.cc/W7GA-7XJP].
146. See Dan Listwa, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Long Term Health Effects, COLUM.
UNIV.
CTR.
FOR
NUCLEAR
STUDIES
(Aug.
9,
2012),
https://k1project.columbia.edu/news/hiroshima-and-nagasaki [https://perma.cc/BD6SKZ3J] (“[I]t may be many years after exposure before an increase in the incident rate of
cancer due to radiation becomes evident.”).
147. See id.
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radiation and sicknesses resulting therefrom.148 The ICJ Opinion
recognized that it would be extremely difficult for a state to create
a nuclear weapon that would not cause unnecessary suffering.149
The International Committee of the Red Cross’ research further
supports this, citing numerous sources holding that nuclear
weapons cause unnecessary suffering.150
2. Unnecessarily Excessive Because of Nuclear Winter
Radiation is an inescapable consequence of using a tactical
nuclear weapon and any discussion surrounding the legal use of
such a weapon must consider it.151 Countries must be able to
control their weapons from causing superfluous injury. The US Air
Force argues that controlling radiation is not relevant to targeting
and, as a result, collateral effects are not relevant to necessity.152
However, the ICJ disagreed with this interpretation.153 The United
States does not control radiation from tactical nuclear weapons,
even though it argues that it complies with necessity’s superfluous
injury requirement in regards to radiation because the initial strike
is controllable.154 In 2015, the Department of Defense recognized
that control is influenced by a weapon’s effects, which may signal
148. See NRC, supra note 118; see also supra Section IV.A.
149. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 262-63, ¶ 95. The court left
the door open to clean nuclear weapons:
[I]n view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, to which the
Court has referred above, the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely
reconcilable with respect for [complying with discrimination and necessity
by way of unnecessary suffering]. Nevertheless, the Court considers that it
does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty
that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.
Id.
150. See generally Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or
Unnecessary Suffering, CUSTOMARY IHL (last visited Mar. 21, 2021), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule70#Fn_3460CD3C_00055
[https://perma.cc/V5KF-6THS].
151. See Bengs, supra note 94, at 327.
152. MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript at 111).
153. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 242-44 (arguing that if
a country were to use a nuclear weapon, the unique characteristic of radiation is so
extreme that it must be accounted for to comply with necessity; the ICJ argued that
necessity demands that radiation cannot so severely affect the environment unless use of
nuclear weapon was absolutely necessary to military success, and, therefore, recognized
that the weapons effects are more important than the weapon itself).
154. See MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript at 111-12).
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a transition away from the older Air Force definition of
necessity.155 Likewise, the ICJ in other judicial opinions has argued
that destroying property after military action is no longer
necessary is a crime.156 This idea may give weight to an argument
that radiation is unnecessary because radiation initiates
continuous destruction after military action is no longer necessary.
Military analysts judge necessity by a standard of subjective
reasoning, and collateral damage can be justified if the destruction
of towns is marginal compared to the military victory achieved.157
Nuclear winter is a climate condition which would kill crops, cause
colder temperatures, and inevitably kill people all over the
globe.158 Additionally, an exchange of low-yield weapons in a
regional conflict could easily lead to nuclear escalation and,
subsequently, nuclear winter.159 Therefore, an analysis of necessity
for use of any tactical nuclear weapon should fail immediately if
there is no consideration of escalation and collateral damage from
radiation and nuclear winter.160 Radiation would persist on the
land struck by a tactical nuclear weapon for decades or centuries
after a strike and could spread across the globe.161 Therefore, using
155. Id. (manuscript at 129) (citing OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF.,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL §6.7.4 at 342-43, 2015).
156. DARCY, supra note 104, at 149.
157. See id. at 147.
158. Nuclear
Winter,
BYJUS
(last
visited
Dec.
12,
2020),
https://byjus.com/biology/nuclear-winter/ [https://perma.cc/KR9N-BGR2].
159. MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript at 760-61) (citing studies that concluded
that nuclear winter would occur as a result of a regional nuclear war between India and
Pakistan in which 100 fifteen kiloton nuclear weapons were used); see also Fred Kaplan,
The Senseless Danger of the Military’s New “Low-Yield” Nuclear Warhead, SLATE (Feb. 18,
2020),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/02/low-yield-warhead-nuclearweapons-navy-trident-submarines.html [https://perma.cc/9V8A-XD4W]; Seth Baum,
Winter-Safe Deterrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence, 36
CONTEMP. SECURITY POL’Y 123 (2015).
160. See Moxley, supra note 40 (manuscript at 111) (noting that military action is
illegal if radiation does more harm than military benefit).
161. The Chernobyl was a localized, small nuclear explosion in Chernobyl, Ukraine in
1986. The melt down of nuclear reactor at Chernobyl led to a 0.3kt explosion, but "the
lighter material was carried by wind over Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and to some extent
over Scandinavia and Europe." The Chernobyl accident is a premier example of how small
nuclear explosions at ground level can send fallout scattered across the globe. Chernobyl
WORLD-NUCLEAR.ORG
(May
2021),
https://www.worldAccident
1986,
nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobylaccident.aspx [https://perma.cc/2PL4-MRFY]; see also Henry Ridgwell, 30 Years On,
Chernobyl
Still
Leaks
Radiation,
VOA
(April
26,
2016),
https://www.voanews.com/europe/30-years-chernobyl-still-leaks-radiation
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a tactical nuclear weapon against a limited military target is
excessive, unnecessary force because it scars the earth so violently
with radiation and could lead to nuclear escalation and, ultimately,
nuclear winter.
The United States argues that radiation is irrelevant because
it did not consider it as an important means to destroying the
objective.162 This argument is flawed when considering the
possibilities of nuclear winter and nuclear escalation. Some
scholars argue that once the nuclear threshold is passed, even by
use of a tactical nuclear weapon, nuclear war could easily become
the norm.163 In a different case, the ICJ recognized a duty for states
to conduct war in a manner that limits the amount of catastrophe;
use of a tactical nuclear weapon would fail that duty.164
3. Unnecessarily Excessive because of Advancements in
Conventional Weapons’ Capabilities
Nuclear weapons clearly have an inconceivable capacity to
destroy,165 and various scholars recognize that this destructive
power is unnecessarily excessive for missions that seek to use
tactical nuclear weapons.166 Previous predictions about the
[https://perma.cc/KL5S-3XYB]; Christina Maza, Is Chernobyl Safe? Can You Live There
Now?
Experts
Explain
the
Risks,
NEWSWEEK
(May
5,
2019),
https://www.newsweek.com/chernobyl-safe-now-when-will1414489#:~:text=It%20depends%20on%20which%20part%20of%20Chernobyl%20yo
u%27re,it%20will%20be%20until%20Chernobyl%20is%20completely%20safe
[https://perma.cc/4Q8Y-5Q42]; Kaplan, supra note 159; MOXLEY, supra note 40
(manuscript at 712-13).
162. MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript at 248-51).
163. See Kaplan, supra note 159; MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript at 274-75)
(noting that use of a nuclear weapon will inherently escalate conflict); Nelson, supra note
22, at 69 (noting that the idea of tactical nuclear weapons as a clean, surgical strike is a
“dangerous myth” both because it is factually untrue and would lead to escalation).
164. DARCY, supra note 104, at 145 (citing International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, Judgment of Justice Pal, in DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
809, 830 (Neil Boister and Robert Cryer eds., 2008)).
165. See Ashley Kirk, How Many Nukes are in the World and What Could they Destroy?,
THE TELEGRAPH (July 4, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/many-nukes-worldcould-destroy/ [https://perma.cc/B97Z-UEM8].
166. This idea has been gaining traction since 2000. See Stephen Younger, Nuclear
Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (June 27, 2000),
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/doe/younger.htm#:~:text=Advances%20in%
20conventional%20weapons%20technology%20suggest%20that%20by,might%20requ
ire%20a%20nuclear%20weapon%20for%20assured%20destruction
[https://perma.cc/74TL-V3HD] (“[A]dvances in conventional weapons technology
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destructive strength of conventional weapons have come to
fruition.167 The United States has continued to develop bigger and
stronger conventional weapons in an effort to maintain global and
regional superiority.168 Two conventional weapons, one
nicknamed the Mother of All Bombs (“MOAB”)169 and the other
only referred to by its official name GBU-57 Massive Ordinance
Penetrator (“MOP”),170 have revealed that tactical nuclear
weapons are unnecessary because these conventional weapons
are capable of immense destruction.
The United States used the MOAB in 2017 for the first time
and it delivered a payload of approximately eleven tons of TNT.171
The United States used the bomb against Islamic State forces in
Afghanistan and targeted systems of tunnels and caves.172 While

suggest that by 2020 precision long-range conventional weapons may be capable of
performing some of the missions currently assigned to nuclear weapons.”).
167. See Luke O’Brien, Let’s Get Something Straight About Nuclear Weapons, MODERN
WAR INSTITUTE AT WEST POINT (Mar. 26, 2019), https://mwi.usma.edu/lets-get-thingsstraight-nuclear-weapons/ [https://perma.cc/5WV8-GN68] (“Even when it comes to
attacking static targets like key logistics nodes, ports of entry, and headquarters, one sees
that while nuclear weapons pose an obvious threat to them, so too do sufficiently advanced
conventional weapons.”); John Mueller, Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter, CATO INST. (Oct. 15,
2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter
[https://perma.cc/S3ZU-TQZ9] (“[B]ecause there simply aren’t many targets that can’t be
attacked as effectively with conventional weapons.”).
168. See Frank Rose, As Russia and China Improve Their Conventional Military
Capabilities, Should the US Rethink its Assumptions on Extended Nuclear Deterrence?,
(Oct.
23,
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromBROOKINGS
chaos/2018/10/23/as-russia-and-china-improve-their-conventional-militarycapabilities-should-the-us-rethink-its-assumptions-on-extended-nuclear-deterrence/
[https://perma.cc/ALP5-CC24].
169. Abigail Abrams, The U.S. Just Dropped the ‘Mother of All Bombs’ in Afghanistan.
But What Is That?, TIME (April 13, 2017), https://time.com/4739302/mother-of-allbombs-afghanistan-what-is-that/ [https://perma.cc/GN3Z-9Q5C]; see also Robin Wright,
Trump Drops the Mother of All Bombs on Afghanistan, NEW YORKER (April 14, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trump-drops-the-mother-of-all-bombson-afghanistan [https://perma.cc/M45A-2QMK].
170. Air Force Posts Video of B-2 Dropping Two GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator
(MOP) Bunker-Busting Bombs, MILITARY AEROSPACE & ELEC. (May 20, 2019),
https://www.militaryaerospace.com/home/article/14033495/air-force-posts-video-ofb2-dropping-two-gbu57-massive-ordnance-penetrator-mop-bunkerbusting-bombs
[https://perma.cc/P4FA-7AAV].
171. Zack Beauchamp, MOAB, the Largest Non-Nuclear Bomb Ever Used by the US
(April
14,
2017),
Military,
Explained,
VOX
https://www.vox.com/world/2017/4/13/15292418/moab-mother-of-all-bombs
[https://perma.cc/D9ZG-75KY].
172. Wright, supra note 169.
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many regard the mission as successful,173 others note that it did not
substantially change the course of events in the region.174 This
failure was not because the blast was insufficient, but rather
because of the number of connected caves and tunnels.175 Use of a
weapon more powerful than the MOAB, notably a tactical nuclear
weapon, would have had the same military success as the MOAB
because the limitations of the MOAB strike were not due to weapon
characteristics; notably, the weapon had a comparable blast
radius.176
Though its tonnage is substantially lower than the fifteenkiloton ceiling for tactical nuclear weapons considered in this Note,
the MOAB shares some characteristics to tactical nuclear
weapons.177 One such characteristic is blast: the MOAB and Little
Boy, a fifteen-kiloton nuclear weapon, both have a blast radius of
one mile.178 Another similar characteristic is the response to its
use. While some commentators argued that the force was
excessive, military officials noted that this strike was necessary.179
There has been no other target that merits the use of the MOAB.180
Even use of this eleven ton conventional bomb against non-state
terrorists drew sharp criticism by Afghani politicians.181 Based on
responses to the MOAB strike, arguments around nuclear
escalation as a response to use of a tactical nuclear weapon are
173. See e.g., id.; Beauchamp, supra note 171; Helene Cooper & Mujib Mashal, U.S.
Drops ‘Mother of All Bombs’ on ISIS Caves in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/asia/moab-mother-of-all-bombsafghanistan.html [https://perma.cc/S5FX-8MV5].
174. See The Mother of All Bombs: How Badly did it Hurt IS in Afghanistan?, BBC NEWS
(April
27,
2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39705128
[https://perma.cc/78E9-SEBW].
175. Id.
176. See Tayag, supra note 7.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See U.S. Drops “mother of all bombs” in Afghanistan, Marking Weapon’s First Use,
CBS NEWS (April 13, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-drops-mother-of-allbombs-in-afghanistan-marking-weapons-first-use/ [https://perma.cc/AV7N-HJ8H].
180. Sune Rasmussen, ‘It Felt like the Heavens were Falling’: Afghans Reel from Moab
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
13,
2017,
4:25
PM),
Impact,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/14/it-felt-like-the-heavens-werefalling-afghans-reel-from-moabsimpact#:~:text=A%20GPS%2Dguided%20demolition%20bomb,of%20more%20than%2
0a%20mile [https://perma.cc/6M8T-JD2G].
181. See U.S. Drops “Mother of All Bombs” in Afghanistan, Marking Weapon’s First Use,
supra note 179.
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quite convincing.182 In many respects, the MOAB accomplishes
everything a tactical nuclear weapon would be used for but
without emitting excess radiation.183 Furthermore, MOAB
showcased just how likely escalation would be on account of the
extreme negative feedback from Afghani politicians who saw the
event as the United States using Afghanistan as a testing ground for
new weapons, saying that Afghans need to fight back against these
acts.184
The MOP is the largest non-nuclear weapon in the United
States arsenal and, unlike the MOAB, has never been used in
combat.185 The US military designed the MOP to be a “bunker
buster,” a bomb which destroys hard and deeply buried targets; the
MOP's destructive capabilities have been consistently updated and
improved for years.186 One reason behind updating the MOP was
to target the Iranian nuclear facility at Fordo.187 In 2019, reports
about the current upgrades to the MOP stated that it is more
capable of reaching the underground target than any previous
variant,188 which compounds statements made in 2013 by the
United States reassuring Israel that the MOP could destroy the

182. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 245.
183. See Fatima Tlis, Sputnik: U.S. MOAB Caused 'Radiation' Diseases in Afghanistan,
POLYGRAPH (July 31, 2017), https://www.polygraph.info/a/sputnik-afghanistan-us-moabradiation-refuted/28641772.html [https://perma.cc/C9MN-B8FH] (refuting the notion
that the MOAB had created any radioactive fallout). Nuclear weapons are distinguished
from conventional weapons because they use radioactive materials, conventional
weapons, like the MOAB, do not use or create radiation. See U.S. Drops “Mother of all Bombs”
in Afghanistan, Marking Weapon’s First Use, supra note 179; Rasmussen, supra note 180;
The Mother of All Bombs: How badly did it hurt IS in Afghanistan?, supra note 174.
184. The strike was used against stateless terrorists, the Islamic State, but some
Afghani politicians were appalled at the Trump administration’s disregard for Afghani
land, arguing that this was an unnecessary show of force to test new dangerous
conventional weapons. See U.S. Drops “Mother of all Bombs” in Afghanistan, Marking
Weapon’s First Use, supra note 179.
185. See Air Force Posts Video of B-2 Dropping Two GBU-57 Massive Ordnance
Penetrator (MOP) Bunker-Busting Bombs, supra note 170.
186. Christopher Woody, The Air Force is Ordering More of its Biggest Nonnuclear
Bomb — Designed to Take Out Underground Targets like Those in North Korea or Iran, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 23, 2018, 4:06 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/air-force-orderingmore-gbu-57-massive-ordnance-penetrators-2018-2 [https://perma.cc/7DN9-LKWC].
187. Joseph Trevithick, Air Force Updates Massive Ordnance Penetrator Bombs Amid
New Iranian Nuclear Posturing, THE DRIVE (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.thedrive.com/thewar-zone/30872/air-force-updates-massive-ordnance-penetrator-bombs-amid-newiranian-nuclear-posturing [https://perma.cc/L2DU-74VY].
188. See id.
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facility at Fordo.189 Compared to tactical nuclear bunker-busters
discussed below, the MOP would be more successful and would not
have the dangers of radiation and nuclear escalation.190
Based on the factual considerations of superfluous injury and
military necessity, the rule of necessity cannot justify the use of
tactical nuclear weapons. The United States does not recognize
excess radiation as an issue of necessity,191 but the ICJ recognized
that radiation emission is a breach of necessity.192 Radiation
emission and dispersion is not necessary for the success of any
operation which uses a tactical nuclear weapon.193 Rather,
radiation’s uncontrollability from use of a tactical nuclear weapon
is a violation of necessity. Furthermore, extremely powerful
conventional weapons, albeit largely possessed by the United
States, are as good as or sometimes better than tactical nuclear
weapons at completing limited or battlefield missions.194 Tactical
nuclear weapons, as shown, cause superfluous injury and are an
unnecessary amount of force when used as battlefield strikes.
189. US to Israel: Redesigned Bomb Can Destroy Fordo Nuke Plant, YNET NEWS (May 3,
2013),
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4375597,00.html
[https://perma.cc/BRX6-W9PJ].
190. See discussion infra Section IV.C; see also Air Force Asks Boeing to Build BunkerBusting Super Bomb with Ruggedized Guidance for Deeply Buried Targets,
(Sept.
20,
2021),
MILITARYAEROSPACE
https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/14210552/bunkerbusting-superbomb-ruggedized-guidance# [https://perma.cc/48W2-NPLD] ("The conventional
Massive Ordnance Penetrator is 20 feet long, and is designed to penetrate targets more
deeply on impact than any other existing nuclear bunker-busting weapon, and then
detonating its three-ton explosives payload.").
191. See U.S. Air Force, International Law: The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air
Operations 6-5 (Nov. 19, 1976) (“[T]he use of explosive nuclear weapons, whether by air,
sea or land forces, cannot be regarded as violative of existing international law in the
absence of any international rule of law restricting their employment.”); The United States,
in its brief to the Court, distinguished nuclear from poison weapons by saying that
although the weapons "may create toxic byproducts" this does not cause it to be a poison
weapon. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion supra note 3, United States Br. at 24. The
United States also failed to mention radiation in its brief, noting only that the power of a
nuclear weapon is not inherently going to create unnecessary suffering. Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion supra note 3, United States Br. at 28.
192. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 262, ¶ 92, 95 (calling
nuclear weapons’ superfluous injury “scarcely reconcilable with respect” to necessity).
193. This statement does not include use of a neutron bomb, the aforementioned
failed project to design a clean nuclear bomb. See, e.g., Neutron Bomb, supra note 106.
194. See US to Israel: Redesigned Bomb Can Destroy Fordo Nuke Plant, supra note 194;
see also Tayag, supra note 176; Woody, supra note 186; Air Force Posts Video of B-2
Dropping Two GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) Bunker-Busting Bombs, supra
note 170; Beauchamp, supra note 171; O’Brien, supra note 167; Mueller, supra note 167.

462

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
C.

[Vol. 45:2

Proportionality

Proportionality does not consider only the size of weapons,
but also whether civilian casualty is proportionate to the military
necessity.195 Even though a conventional bomb could destroy a
remote submarine, a tactical nuclear weapon could do the same
and there would still be no direct civilian casualties from the blast
or heat. However, the submarine being alone in a remote ocean
does not mean that a pre-strike analysis should not consider
civilian casualties196 because radiation dispersion and extreme
oceanic storms could be disastrous.197 Worth noting,
contemporary proportionality is largely customary law, and, like
necessity, is not binding based on words in a treaty, but rather by
the collective action of states.198 As a customary law, the general
doctrine of proportionality requires a state to justify the value of
civilian casualty against military necessity.199

195. See A.P.V. Rogers, The Principle of Proportionality, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF
MILITARY FORCE, 189, 189 (Howard M. Hensel ed., 2008); see also MOXLEY, supra note 40
(manuscript at 69) (failing to comply with proportionality means the “probable effects [of
a weapon] upon non-combatant persons or objects would likely be disproportionate to the
value of the anticipated military objective”).
196. See Rogers, supra note 195, at 189 (noting that the International Committee of
the Red Cross argues that every party to war must make an assessment to civilian casualty
for any strike).
197. There is little evidence as to the effects of underwater low-yield nuclear
explosions. However, tests of these low-yield weapons (roughly twenty kilotons) in the
Pacific in the 1940s and 1950s showed that the detonations destroyed the seafloor and
released huge amounts of radioactive particles into the air. Additionally, in most instances
of low-yield underwater nuclear tests, scientists were surprised at how unexpectedly
disastrous the weapons were. See Sarah Laskow, Decades Ago, the U.S. Military Set Off a
Nuke Underwater, And It Went Very Badly, ATLAS OBSCURA (July 19, 2016),
https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/70-years-ago-the-us-military-set-off-a-nukeunderwater-and-it-went-very-badly [https://perma.cc/UUJ3-SYUL].
198. Rogers, supra note 195, at 195-96; see also Customary Law, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS (last visited Nov. 22, 2020), https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treatiescustomary-law/customary-law
[https://perma.cc/XZ2G-NEMR]
(“Customary
international law . . . can be found in official accounts of military operations but is also
reflected in a variety of other official documents, including military manuals, national
legislation and case law.”); MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript at 69-74) (describing
proportionality through various United States armed forces’ manuals).
199. See Rogers, supra note 195, at 203.
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1. Nuclear Risk Exceeds Any Risk Associated with Conventional
Weapons
All nuclear weapons pose a distinct existential threat to the
world, and considering any nuclear strike as threatless to civilians
is a fallacy because radiation and escalation are virtually certain.
The ICJ Opinion did not entertain risk analysis200 but recognized
that nuclear weapons of any yield pose such a unique threat that
all nuclear weapons and the associated risks are necessary
considerations if a state plans to use a nuclear weapon.201 One
scholar argued that states would only be able to legally use any
nuclear weapon if the state’s very survival was at stake.202
However, the scholar continues, it seems highly unlikely that
targeting a submarine or some other remote, limited target, like a
bunker, would eliminate such an existential threat.203
Also, consider that tactical nuclear weapons are limited not
only by size but by delivery method.204 It is highly unlikely that a
tactical nuclear weapon would be within a reasonable distance for
which a counter strike would be possible.205 Therefore, tactical
200. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 245, ¶ 43. States without
nuclear weapons argue that the “
[The] very nature of nuclear weapons, and the high probability of an
escalation of nuclear exchanges, mean that there is an extremely strong risk
of devastation. The risk factor is said to negate the possibility of the
condition of proportionality being complied with. The Court does not find it
necessary to embark upon the quantification of such risks; nor does it need to
enquire into the question whether tactical nuclear weapons exist which are
sufficiently precise to limit those risks: it suffices for the Court to note that
the very nature of all nuclear weapons and the profound risks associated
therewith are further considerations to be borne in mind by States
believing they can exercise a nuclear response in self-defense in accordance
with the requirements of proportionality. Id. (emphasis added).
201. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 245, ¶ 43 ("It suffices
for the Court to note that the very nature of all nuclear weapons and the profound risks
associated therewith are further considerations to be borne in mind by States believing
they can exercise a nuclear response in self-defence in accordance with the requirements
of proportionality.").
202. DARCY, supra note 104, at 195-96.
203. See id. at 194-96.
204. See WOOLF, supra note 78, at 8-9.
205. Considering that most U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are air delivered, meaning
that aircraft would have to be scrambled to deliver the payload, U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons are not readily aimed at a fixed target as was the case during the Cold War. See
WOOLF, supra note 78, at summary page (“The United States now has, according to
unclassified estimates, approximately 230 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 100
deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States.”).
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nuclear weapons, which are characterized as useful for missions
targeting a lone submarine or underground bunker, would be
insufficient to cure an existential threat and are a disproportionate
response.206 A tactical nuclear weapon could be used to eliminate
the threatening state’s headquarters or capital, but that strike
would likely result in mass civilian casualties and is therefore a
breach of the other principles of the Law of Armed Conflict and
would not be a limited battlefield strike.
The most justifiable use of a tactical nuclear weapon is when
the survival of the state is at stake. That use, however, would likely
not end that existential threat and ensure the state’s survival and
thus should not merit the use of a tactical nuclear weapon. The
“best case scenario” for legal use seems to pose a fatal flaw, notably
that the military advantage would be disproportionate and
insignificant to civilian loss of life and property.207 A more
justifiable use than self-defense would be a limited strike against a
remote target, but that use could lead to an escalation of nuclear
warfare. Complying with proportionality means considering that
escalation.208 If the only viable justification to pass the nuclear
threshold is the preservation of a state’s very existence, and if
tactical nuclear weapons are ineffective toward that end,209 then
206. See Hans Kristensen, Declassified: US Nuclear Weapons at Sea, FEDERATION OF
AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (Feb. 3, 2016), https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/02/nuclearweapons-at-sea/ [https://perma.cc/TNG4-ZHNZ] (“The tactical naval nuclear weapons
were considered more acceptable to use early in a conflict because there would be few
civilian casualties. But any use would probably quickly have escalated into large-scale
nuclear war and the end of the world as we know it.”).
207. This scenario is based on one submarine being attacked by a tactical nuclear
weapon. If there were, say, a fleet of nuclear submarines attack a state and that state
responded with a volley of tactical nuclear weapons, that creates an issue of magnitude [of
whether the analysis should be on one missile or the volley] and largely outside the scope
of this paper. Also, that scenario would certainly lead to an extensive nuclear exchange
and, thus, not worthy of discussion here because the Big Three principles would certainly
be violated at some point in the ensuing exchange. See supra Section IV.A-B (arguing that
the facts of use only one tactical nuclear weapon in any environment would disperse
indiscriminate effects in the form of radiation, that a volley of these weapons would only
magnify that indiscriminate effect, and passing the nuclear threshold is unnecessary and
would escalate conflicts).
208. John Burroughs, International Law and First Use of Nuclear Weapons,
WAGINGPEACE.COM (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.wagingpeace.org/international-lawfirst-use-nuclear-weapons/ [https://perma.cc/Q4ML-JRFD] (“The risk of escalation is
part of the proportionality calculus.”).
209. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 263, ¶ 97. Despite tactical
nuclear weapons general failure to reconcile with the principles of the Law of Armed
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any use of such weapons would violate the principle of
proportionality.
2. Proportionality Extends Beyond Protecting Humanity
Environmental destruction and the impact of radiation are
crucial considerations regardless of a tactical nuclear weapon’s
direct impact on humans.210 The ICJ noted that protecting the
environment is a duty borne by states regardless of what treaties
they have ratified.211 The environment poses unique issues for
proportionality. Land subject to a tactical nuclear weapon’s
explosion can remain radioactive after the initial blast between
hundreds to tens of thousands of years.212 A strike in a remote part
of the ocean where nuclear material remains radioactive and
highly mobile would be similarly devastating.213 As noted before,
earth-penetrating and underground blasts are disastrous in terms
of the radiation dispersion that they can cause.214 In the same
manner, underwater tactical nuclear explosions disperse radiation
into the air, depending on ocean depth and how deeply a bomb
explodes, by destroying the seafloor and sending radioactive
materials up the column of the blast into the atmosphere.215
Fire is a result of thermal radiation - a characteristic unique to
nuclear weapons.216 Some areas, such as those with large pine or
spruce forests, should never be the subject of a tactical nuclear
strike. The combination of sensitive vegetation and the extreme
heat created by the blast and subsequent radiation would create
Conflict, the Court observed “that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality
or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of selfdefense, in which its very survival would be at stake.” Id.
210. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 241, 262.
211. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 242, ¶ 29 (“[T]he general
obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the
environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus
of international law relating to the environment.”(emphasis added)).
212. See, e.g., Ridgwell, supra note 161; Maza, supra note 161.
213. SW. FISHERIES SCI. CTR., Fukushima Radiation in U.S. West Coast Tuna, NOAA
FISHERIES (July 10, 2020), https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/west-coast/sciencedata/fukushima-radiation-us-west-coast-tuna [https://perma.cc/ES47-LLC7].
214. See supra Section IV.A (discussing the use of tactical nuclear weapons as bunker
busters and earth-penetrating weapons); see generally Nelson, supra note 22.
215. See Laskow, supra note 197 (stating that the extreme heat and the energy of the
blast destroy or disperse water which can give radioactive seafloor the opportunity to
enter the atmosphere).
216. See NRC, supra note 118, at 73.
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massive fires.217 Even without considering proximity of the actual
blast to civilians, the fires caused by a tactical nuclear weapon
would threaten civilian lives. A state would have a difficult time
justifying a strike that causes such extensive environmental
damage because the use of incendiary weapons on forests is
illegal.218
3. Proposed Tactical Nuclear Weapon Use Would Result in Mass
Casualty and Injury
The United States argues that radiation from a tactical nuclear
weapon is irrelevant because its intended use as a bunker-buster
would limit the radiation dispersed by trapping the blast and
radioactive material underground.219 The argument that this use
would create a disproportionate response relies on the threat of
environmental
destruction
and
radiation
dispersion,
considerations that the ICJ saw as a necessary part of any military
analysis about nuclear weapons.220 The United States has retired
or dismantled nearly all of its tactical nuclear weapons except the
B61 class,221 which was initially designed to be a bunker-buster.222
These weapons are designed to penetrate the earth so as to destroy
targets like concrete bunkers that are otherwise difficult to
infiltrate.223 The issue, however, is that every attempt to make a
feasible tactical nuclear bunker-buster has been a failure.224 This
217. See id. at 92; see also Incendiary Weapons, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (last
visited Mar. 21, 2021), https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/incendiary-weapons
[https://perma.cc/3SVJ-SZYV] [hereinafter Incendiary Weapons].
218. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 242; see also Incendiary
Weapons, supra note 217.
219. See MOXLEY, supra note 40 (manuscript at 266-67); see also Nelson, supra note
22, at 69-71 (noting that the United States failed to properly develop a tactical nuclear
weapon that could be used as a bunker buster or as an earth penetrating weapon even
though that was the quintessential argument for why tactical nuclear weapons were a
necessary addition to a strategic nuclear weapons arsenal).
220. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 242, ¶ 30 (“States must
take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives.”).
221. DEP’T OF DEF., NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 49 (2018).
222. ALEXANDER & MILLER, supra note 5, at 8; Nelson, supra note 22, at 70.
223. Nelson, supra note 22, at 69. But see discussion supra Section IV.B (noting that
conventional weapons are actually better bunker busters than tactical weapons are).
224. Nelson, supra note 22, at 69 (noting that in 1994 the Defense Authorization Act
suspended all funding on researching tactical nuclear weapons); Bengs, supra note 94, at
347 (noting that the B61 class of nuclear weapons are the only one that the government
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failure is due to a variety of factual considerations about the
environment, such as soil and rock composition, and the actual
weapon itself, such as the casing being too weak to withstand the
force of penetrating the earth.225
Assuming a tactical nuclear weapon successfully penetrated
the earth, a nuclear missile with an explosive power of 0.1k would
have to be 140 feet underground before radiation would be
contained in favorable geological conditions.226 The greatest depth
ever achieved by a nuclear weapon has only been about twenty
feet.227 From an environmental standpoint, a tactical nuclear
weapon, operating as a bunker buster, would be a devastating
failure. Until 150 feet, the crater caused by a tactical nuclear
weapon explosion widens as the weapon penetrates further into
the Earth. As the crater widens, more radioactive material
disperses into the atmosphere.228 Therefore, if the most successful
low-yield bunker-buster were able to penetrate five times deeper
than its current capabilities, it would still disperse more radiation
than an explosion at ground level. That weapon's failure to meet
the depth requirements to contain radiation would send more
particles into the air as its depth increased.229 So, a tactical nuclear
detonation as a bunker-buster is a disproportionate response to
the military advantage gained. Notably, the environment and any
has considered a feasible bunker buster, but, even then, recognized that they were useless
in that capacity).
225. See Earth-Penetrating Weapons, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (June 6, 2005),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/earth-penetrating-weapons
[https://perma.cc/3EF5-Z5L8] (discussing the failures of nuclear earth penetrating
weapons, notably that increased velocity is required to actually penetrate further into the
Earth, but that increased velocity only results in the destruction of the casing of the
warhead upon impact; also noting that “penetration depths will be larger in dry soil than
concrete or rock, but one would have to expect that a hardened target would be placed
below hard rock or concrete”).
226. Nelson, supra note 22, at 70.
227. Favorable geological conditions mean that the soil and rock composition is such
that it is favorable to not be blown into the area at an explosion at this depth, so, some
areas that are more sand than, say, hard rock would likely need to be buried deeper
because it would be easier for an explosion of the same size at the same depth to send
particles into the sky. See Nelson, supra note 22, at 70; see also Weapons of Mass
Destruction,
B61-11
Earth-Penetrating
Weapon,
GLOBALSECURITY
https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b61-11.htm [https://perma.cc/5LEHQ6E6] (last visited Nov. 18, 2021).
228. See Nelson, supra note 22, at 75 (noting that at 150 feet and deeper the size of
the crater will be relatively the same).
229. See id. at 69-71, 75.
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nearby civilian populations would be disproportionately harmed
because the failure to successfully penetrate the earth would
exacerbate the problems of radiation.230 Despite the lack of any
conclusive studies on the subject, the same seems true for
underwater tactical nuclear detonations.231
While detonating tactical missiles above ground to destroy
bunkers is a possibility, those weapons would not be low-yield.232
Research shows that it would take a 100-kiloton nuclear bomb
detonated above ground to destroy a target one hundred feet
underground.233 The argument against bunker busters is
compounded when considering escalation. The issue is clear:
passing the nuclear threshold in this case would not amount to
military success because a tactical nuclear weapon would neither
ensure a successful mission nor be reliably used in self-defense.234
The nail in the coffin is that conventional weapons operate as
bunker-busters substantially better than nuclear weapons do,
notably because of the weak metal casings that house nuclear
warheads.235 Conventional weapons can deliver a 5,000-pound
payload at one hundred feet which, depending on the depth of the
bunker and material used, could be more than enough destructive
force.236
Though the land in Chernobyl will be radioactive for tens of
thousands of years, Hiroshima is habitable today because of the
altitude of the respective explosions.237 The radiation dispersion in
Hiroshima that resulted from Little Boy cannot be a basis to predict
the radiation dispersion that would occur from a bunker-buster.
The explosion over Hiroshima was in a “no fallout zone” and was
not an earth penetrating weapon.238 Therefore, the Hiroshima
230. See generally NRC, supra note 118.
231. See Laskow, supra note 197.
232. See Earth-Penetrating Weapons, supra note 225 (noting that in the event that a
weapon cannot achieve greater penetration, an increased yield would suffice to destroy
deeply buried targets).
233. See Nelson, supra note 22, at 75.
234. See generally id.; see also DARCY, supra note 104, at 195; supra Section IV.A.
235. See Bengs, supra note 94, at 347; see also discussion, supra Section IV.B.
236. See Bengs, supra note 94, at 347.
237. Hiroshima was detonated in a fallout free zone, supra Section IV.A.2, whereas
the Chernobyl explosion happened at ground level. See A.C. Grimes, How Much Radiation
Still Exists in Hiroshima?, GRUNGE (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.grunge.com/191959/howmuch-radiation-still-exists-in-hiroshima/ [https://perma.cc/5Q6B-XDN9].
238. See NRC, supra note 118, at 82.
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explosion is not an example of how low-yield nuclear weapons
cause little radiation dispersion because Little Boy was not a
bunker-buster or earth-penetrating weapon. Thus, when
considering tactical nuclear weapons, a discussion of
proportionality must address radiation as an inherently
disproportionate effect.
Military advantage cannot be disproportionate to the damage
to civilian property and objects.239 There is, then, an issue of time—
notably, whether military commanders should have to consider
the long-term impact of radiation as it affects the environment.240
The ICJ argued that the environment must be a part of the Law of
Armed Conflict analysis241 and it recognized that nuclear weapons
pose a unique threat because of their ability to influence time and
space.242 The logical conclusion, based on evidence from
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Fukushima, and Chernobyl, is that nuclear
weapons devastate land long after the end of a war.243
If the Court were to consider this issue again, the timeenvironmental issue should be presented. Based on modern
science,244 the Court should recognize that nuclear weapons are a
disproportionate response to any military target because of the
unique effects of lasting and dispersed radiation.245 Because of
these long-term effects, and because conventional weapons are on
par with the destructive power of tactical nuclear weapons, there
239. See Rogers, supra note 195, at 189-90.
240. See Jaroslav Krasny, Do Tactical Nukes Break International Law?, BULLETIN OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Dec. 31, 2020), https://thebulletin.org/2020/12/do-tacticalnukes-break-international-law/ [https://perma.cc/9S6S-44Q6] (advocating for the
position that use of a tactical nuclear weapons is always illegal because the health effects,
on civilians and combatants alike, are so extreme and so long term that there is no
justifiable scenario for use of a tactical weapon). Krasny notes that “the threat of invisible
disease with a possible death sentence would loom for years to come. Once the sentence is
given, an effective remedy is almost non-existent.” Id. Thus, once conflict ends, and
combatants are returned to civilian status, they are still subject to the direct and immediate
effects of the conflict. Id.
241. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 242.
242. Id. at 262.
243. See Grimes, supra note 237; see also SW. FISHERIES SCI. CTR., supra note 213;
Ridgwell, supra note 161; Listwa, supra note 146.
244. See Hansen, supra note 22 (noting that until 2001, models were not
comprehensive enough to ask questions like “What kind of climate anomalies would we
see” because of a nuclear war).
245. See Ridgwell, supra note 161; see also Maza, supra note 161; SW. FISHERIES SCI.
CTR., supra note 213.
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is no scenario where the devasting effects of a tactical nuclear
weapon can be proportional to the advantage gained. Even in the
“perfect scenarios” involving remote submarines and deeply
buried bunkers, civilians are still disproportionately at risk in a
state's use of a tactical nuclear weapon.
D.

Disarmament Negotiations May Resume in the Near Future

Only a few years before the ICJ Opinion, toward the end of the
Cold War, the nuclear powers began additional substantive
international discussions and agreements explicitly on tactical
nuclear weapons.246 Unsurprisingly, the negotiations were largely
between the United States, the Soviet Union, and, subsequently, the
Russian Federation.247 These international negotiations relied on
domestic promises, however, and have not been actually limited by
any US-Russian agreements.248 Fortunately, no tactical nuclear
weapon has been used despite this weak position on restraining
from use.249 The entire world, since the conception of the nuclear
weapon, has anxiously feared doomsday while being protected
only by handed-down promises made by leaders of the world’s
superpowers.250 The international system, and humanity as a
whole, is in desperate need of order and codified protection

246. See Daryl Kimball & Kingston Reif, The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on
Tactical Nuclear Weapons at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (July 2017),
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pniglance [https://perma.cc/3QAG-HLZ7].
247. Id.
248. See id.; see also WOOLF, supra note 78, summary page (“[N]onstrategic nuclear
weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.-Russian arms control agreements.”).
249. Nuclear Weapons, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (last visited
Nov.
7,
2021),
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/
[https://perma.cc/62BE-28X9] (“nuclear weapons have only been used twice in
warfare—in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945” and neither of those
weapons were tactical nuclear weapons”).
250. See Kimball & Reif, supra note 246; cf. Michael Martina, China Will Soon Surpass
Russia as a Nuclear Threat – Senior U.S. Military Official, REUTERS (August 27, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-will-soon-surpass-russia-nuclear-threatsenior-us-military-official-2021-08-27/ [https://perma.cc/J7F6-TUCR]. It is important to
recognize that China is a growing nuclear threat, and that state has, at times, shown an
unwillingness to uphold promises—so while the United States had an oddly amicable
understanding of mutually assured destruction with the Soviet Union, the same cannot yet
be said of the United States’ relationship with China. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 249
(describing how the United Nations has facilitated a number of treaties between certain
countries "'to save humanity'" from " the most dangerous weapons on earth").
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beyond the vague, generally accepted Principles of the Law of
Armed Conflict.
The Biden Administration is set to finalize its Nuclear Posture
Review, the United States’ fifth since the end of the Cold War, in
early 2022.251 President Biden was outspoken against President
Trump’s 2018 review which emphasized bolstering the US nuclear
arsenal.252 Despite that sentiment, many deterrence advocates fear
that Biden will continue the trend of modernizing and improving
nuclear weapons in the wake of the growing threat of Russian and
Chinese nuclear power.253 If so, the inherent danger of the use of
tactical nuclear weapons will grow as the feasibility of use
increases and the line between strategic and tactical further
blurs.254
V. CONCLUSION
Nuclear weapons are the deadliest explosives on the planet.255
Despite this reality, officials and world leaders are still trying to
innovate nuclear weapons to find more tactical uses for them.256
Recent studies from the Global Securities Lab at Princeton
University estimate that use of one tactical nuclear weapon would
escalate conflict and lead to over ninety million deaths or injuries
within three hours after use.257 The ICJ recognized that nuclear
weapons are a perpetual menace but failed to limit the possibility

251. Kingston Reif, Biden Administration Begins Nuclear Posture Review, ARMS
CONTROL
ASS’N
(September
2021),
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/202109/news/biden-administration-begins-nuclear-posture-review
[https://perma.cc/CMG7-FC98].
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Philip Coyle & James McKeon, The Huge Risk of Small Nukes, THE AGENDA
(Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/03/huge-risk-smallnuclear-weapons-000350/
[https://perma.cc/Q3ER-FLBX]
(stating
that
the
modernization of nuclear weapons is an extremely dangerous dilemma as exemplified by
“the B61 gravity bomb, built to be dropped from an airplane, with a variable yield that can
detonate with an explosive force of up to 11 times the force of the Hiroshima blast, or be
dialed down to a tiny fraction of that size” because a state subject to the use of this weapon
would not know about the disastrous effects until after they occur).
255. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 249.
256. See Narang, supra note 80. Delivery systems are an integral part of a nuclear
weapon’s character, and changing a delivery system blurs the line of tactical and strategic
weapons. See also WOOLF, supra note 78, at 8-9.
257. Ioanes & Mosher, supra note 84.
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of their use.258 Evidence since the Court delivered the ICJ Opinion
shows that tactical nuclear weapons cannot reconcile the
principles of the Law of Armed Conflict.259 Tactical nuclear
weapons are a “militarily irrelevant class of bombs . . . [which] are
no longer useful for defense, deterrence, or assurance.”260
If the ICJ revisited this issue, it should distinguish tactical from
strategic nuclear weapons and hold that use of tactical nuclear
weapons is per se illegal because those weapons cause
indiscriminate effects, are unnecessary use of force, inflict
superfluous injury, and are almost never proportional. If the Court
were to do so, there would finally be a binding international ban on
these weapons and the world would no longer rely solely on the
promises of individuals. Tactical nuclear weapons are not reliable
or convenient as battlefield weapons. They are instruments of
mass destruction with uncontainable and disastrous effects. As
such, any use, in any scenario, would be a per se violation of the
Law of Armed Conflict.

258. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, at 266.
259. Notably, the spread of radiation, as well as the considerations discussed in Part
IV. Recognizing this incompatibility, and to limit the looming threat of nuclear annihilation,
the United Nations began enforcing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on
January 22, 2021. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, art. 1, Sept. 20, 2017 (the
signatories agree to never “[u]se or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices). The nuclear powers are not signatories; see also Daryl Kimball &
Shannon Bugos, The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons At A Glance, ARMS
CONTROL
ASSOCIATION
(April
2021),
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclearprohibition [https://perma.cc/925W7QAC].
260. This quote was pieced together from an article describing the authors’ hopes for
discussions at the 2014 NATO Summit in Cardiff, Wales. Hans Kristensen & Adam Mount,
Why NATO Should Eliminate Its Tactical Nukes, Despite Russian Belligerence, BULLETIN OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTIST (Sept. 3, 2014), https://thebulletin.org/2014/09/why-nato-shouldeliminate-its-tactical-nukes-despite-russian-belligerence/
[https://perma.cc/97RYKCNB].
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